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Category Archives: Missouri economy

Elected representatives trump democracy, as Missouri legislature overrides initiatives

When a million Missourians adopt an initiative petition, why should our elected representatives be allowed to override the voice of the people? According to Howard Wright’s blog post, it’s because they can.

Wright describes how our elected representatives have acted to undermine legislation adopted through the initiative petition process provided for in the Missouri Constitution. In particular, Missouri’s puppy mill initiative adopted in 2008 was overturned by the General Assembly in 2009. After Missouri voters approved a minimum wage law in 2006 with a 76% majority, the Missouri House of Representatives attempted to repeal this law, though the bill died in the Senate.

A citizen group called “Your Vote Counts” is attempting to amend the Missouri Constitution to impose a requirement of a 75% vote of the General Assembly to override the voters. Wright suggests that the initiative procedure is a check against the power of dominant political parties, which could otherwise block the will of the vast majority of the voters.

 

HOA needs to get the owner’s name right to collect assessments

Whenever a homeowner association (HOA) gives me an account for collection, the first thing I do is verify the name in which the lot or unit is held. Frequently, the books of the HOA show owner as an individual or couple, often with a nickname.

Failure to keep track of the name in which property is held can defeat a claim for assessments, as shown in River Oaks Homes Association v. Lounce, a case that originated in Jackson County, Missouri.

The HOA obtained a judgment against Zeria Lounce, individually and as trustee of her living trust, for several years’ worth of delinquent assessments. Lounce appealed to the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in finding her personally liable and in finding the trust liable.

The River Oaks covenants provided that assessments were secured by a lien against the lot assessed and were also a personal obligation of  ”the person who was the Owner of such property at the time when the assessment fell due.” Fifteen months after purchasing her townhouse in River Oaks in 1993, Lounce conveyed it to her living trust, with herself as trustee.

Nobody paid the assessments after 2004, and the HOA sued Lounce in her individual capacity. After filing suit, the HOA discovered that Lounce had put the property in the name of her trust and added Lounce, as trustee, as a defendant in the suit. Because the covenant provided for the personal liability of the Owner only, the court of appeals reversed the judgment against Lounce, as an individual.

The court of appeals didn’t let the trust off the hook, stating that the payment obligation ran with the ownership of the property, regardless of whether the HOA was aware of the change in ownership.

Here are the lessons for associations:

  • Pay attention to the county records of ownership. The county assessors’ websites (in most counties in Missouri) are a fairly reliable place to look for the names in which property is held; the recorder’s office is the best authority, though not always the most accessible online. This is important for making sure the proper parties are casting votes in elections, as well as for collections.
  • Ask your collection agency or lawyer to confirm the owners’ identities when preparing liens, sending demand letters and filing collection suits.

Carelessness about ownership can result in the loss of the ability to collect, shifting the burdens to the paying members of the HOA.

 

 

Non-compete can be enforceable without geographic limit

The basic rule is that a non-compete covenant with an employee will not be enforced unless it is reasonable in duration and with respect to the geographic area it applies to. Otherwise, employees would be trapped in jobs, because they wouldn’t be able to work if they left the employer.

But a St. Louis judge’s order was reversed by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District in Whelan Security Co. v. Kennebrew, even though the non-compete covenant did not define the geographic area where the former employee was prohibited from competing with his former employer.

The trial judge had granted summary judgment in the employee’s favor, after having reviewed the employment contract that prohibited Kennebrew from soliciting business from Whelan’s customers or going to work for Whelan’s competitors for 12 months after leaving Whelan. Within four months after separating from Whelan, Kennebrew successfully went after one of Whelan’s customers. The trial court concluded that Kennebrew’s employment agreement was invalid, because it was ”overbroad” and “not reasonable as to time and space.”

The appellate court applied a different rule of law, stating:

a restrictive covenant without geographic limitations is not per se unreasonable if the prohibition is against the solicitation of the employer’s clients and customers.

The geographic scope of Kennebrew’s contract was essentially defined by the location of Whelan’s customers.

Non-compete agreements are recognized and limited by statute in Missouri. The statute, section 431.202 RSMo,  creates a presumption that a one-year duration is reasonable, but allows an employer to prove that a longer period might be appropriate under the circumstances.

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Taxpayers vs. Ratepayers: Taxpayers lose

St. Charles County wanted to widen a road, which required moving the gas line within the right-of-way of Pittman Hill Road. Pittman Hill Road was created by subdivision plats which designated the road’s right-of-way as a utility easement for gas lines (among other utilities), dedicating the entire right-of-way to the public. 

The County asked Laclede Gas Company to pay for the relocation of its gas lines to the right-of-way of the reconstructed road. Laclede claimed that this amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its property. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court ruled for the County, requiring Laclede Gas to pay for the relocation. Laclede appealed directly to the Missouri Supreme Court.

On appeal, the County made four objections: Read the rest of this entry

If the plat complies with the regulations, approval is mandatory

Real estate developers (remember them?) sometimes feel as though they’ve been pulled through a knothole backwards by the time they get a proposed subdivision plat to the stage at which it can be submitted to the local government for approval. According to several Missouri appellate opinions, if a proposed plat complies with the subdivision regulations, the local government has no choice but to approve it.

But reality is different, as shown by Alexander & Lindsey v. Platte County, an opinion issued last week by the Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri. The court reversed the trial court’s refusal to order that the Platte County Commission approve Alexander & Lindsey’s preliminary subdivision plat. But the appellate court noted that the county government would have additional opportunities to coerce Alexander & Lindsey into making more concessions if it attempted to go beyond the preliminary plat to the submittal of a final plat.

“Preliminary plats” are not mentioned in Missouri’s statutes that authorize counties to adopt and administer subdivision regulations. But the two-stage plat approval process is valuable for developers and planning and zoning boards. The preliminary plat approval process is often the means of obtaining approval for an entire project to be constructed in phases. Once the preliminary plat is approved, the developer can proceed with some confidence that final plats of each phase of the project will be approved when submitted. The preliminary plat approval process, sometimes done in conjunction with a rezoning application, introduces the proposed project to the public and the scrutiny of neighbors and a variety of government agencies.

During the preliminary plat approval process, the developer learns that the subdivision regulations, as written, do not represent the full scope of requirements. Often the government’s preferences for stormwater control, traffic signals, intersection improvements and other expensive issues are not expressed in the regulations. The preliminary plat application doesn’t seem to move forward, until the developer has agreed to install infrastructure that is beyond the requirements of the regulations.

When Alexander & Lindsey submitted a preliminary plat for a commercial subdivision with five lots ranging in size from 2 to 4.6 acres. Alexander & Lindsey completed a traffic study and a drainage study, which were approved by the county’s engineer and the Missouri Department of Transportation (MODOT).  The Platte County planning and zoning director found that it complied with the county regulations and recommended that the P&Z board approve it.

When the preliminary plat hearing took place before the P&Z board, several persons expressed concerns. Expressing “concerns” are a common manner of objecting to a project for reasons that are not based on regulations. A public water supply district represented that it could supply drinking water, but not in adequate volume or pressure for fire-suppression. An alderman from the nearby town of Weston was concerned that the project’s building setback line was only 75 feet, rather than 100 feet, as required by Weston’s ordinance; Weston had previously rejected the developer’s annexation petition. MODOT’s engineer stated that MODOT regulations did not require the elimination of a driveway, as suggested by a P&Z board member.

Even though the proposed preliminary plat fully complied with all regulations, the P&Z board voted it down. The developer appealed to the Platte County Commission, which was not bound to follow the P&Z board’s recommendation. The Commission upheld the P&Z board’s denial, citing four reasons:

  • lack of specification of proposed uses
  • lack of water for fire suppression and lack of sewer facilities
  • potential impact of possible sewer lagoons on neighboring properties and the public
  • potential for traffic hazards from the existence two driveways

The appellate court noted that these four objections were outside the scope of the county’s subdivision regulations. Therefore, the county’s refusal to deny the preliminary plat was arbitrary, and the trial court was instructed to order the Commission to approve the preliminary plat.

Appellate court reverses trial court to affirm ban of deer-dogging in Missouri

Last August, Judge Robert L. Smith of Ripley County, Missouri, declared some state regulations regarding deer hunting to be unconstitutional. Those regulations prohibited hunting deer with the aid of dogs and from vehicles. On July 15, 2011, in Turner and Jones v. Missouri Dept of Conservation, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District reversed Judge Smith’s rulings, holding that Neil Turner and Bobby “Shannon” Jones lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of these regulations, which are enforced by the Missouri Department of Conservation.

Turner was among those identified in a federal investigation of a group in Southeast Missouri who in 2008 apparently traveled in ATVs and used dogs to drive deer to hunters in tree stands within the Mark Twain National Forest. The dogs were equipped with radio transmitters. Jones was never charged, but was questioned by a Missouri Department of Conservation (MDC) investigator.

Turner and Jones persuaded Judge Smith that the regulations prohibiting hunting deer with “a motor-driven conveyance” or with dogs were unconstitutionally vague, so vague that they couldn’t tell what was prohibited. In addition, they claimed that the regulations were defective because they were too broad. The vagueness and overbreadth deprived Turner and Jones (and MDC) of notice of what was legal, depriving Turner and Jones of the due process protection afforded by the federal and state constitutions.

In a footnote, the court of appeals indicated that Judge Smith was striking a blow for hunting rights, rather than following the law, quoting his judgment before trashing it:

Upon consideration of all evidence and arguments of the parties, the trial court recognizes that hunting is an important right. In our area, hunting is not only for recreation, but it is a part of our way of life and any infringement of this right must be constitutional.

Turner and Jones had a couple of points. The language of the regulations in questions seems to encompass use of vehicles that is not intended to be prohibited (such as traveling to a hunting area) and only uses the plural term “dogs” not the singular form “dog.” At trial, the attorneys for Turner and Jones asked hypothetical questions of MDC agents about interpretation of the regulations and obtained inconsistent answers. The attorneys argued that not even MDC knew the meaning of its regulations.

But the Court of Appeals had no need to slice-and-dice the hunters’ legal arguments. The appellate court ruled that neither Turner nor Jones had the proper standing to bring the constitutional questions to court in the first place, because the vagueness in the regulations didn’t pertain to the acts that Turner was charged with, and Jones wasn’t charged with anything.  Courts do not have jurisdiction to consider hypothetical questions, so the trial court erred by ruling on the petition of Turner and Jones. In other words, Turner made no claim that the federal prosecution of him would end if the regulations were declared void. Turner’s group had more than one dog, so he couldn’t argue that the regulation was vague about whether use of one dog was prohibited.  Jones was not prosecuted and had nothing at stake.

The idea that the regulations were overbroad received even less respect from the Court of Appeals. MDC successfully argued that the concept of a regulation being overly broad only applies in the context of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. To be constitutional, a regulation that restricts speech or the freedom of people to associate with whomever they wish must be narrowly focused on achieving a legitimate legislative purpose.

Deer-hunting regulations were formulated when deer were much more scarce than now, though seasons and limits have been loosened up considerably. Hunting deer with dogs was considered sporting in the 19th Century and earlier, but ATVs and radio telemetry weren’t a part of the tradition.

Invest now in vacation property!

In preparing for a short talk about how to convey various kinds of vacation real estate, I arrived at the unbrilliant conclusion that people make decisions to buy vacation real estate (RV lots, lake houses, timeshares) based on what they think they want at the time of purchase, with some attention, but not enough attention, to the future. A short version of my presentation is posted here.

Many decisions to purchase vacation property are made when buyers are in a state of vacation bliss, a kind of wistfulness, that makes them less critical than when they’re on their home turf. They hope the vacation property will be a place of togetherness for family and close friends, where memories are created. Perhaps it will become a retirement home, where the grandchildren will want to visit. The sales techniques for vacation property are addressed squarely at those sentiments.

Many of those good things do happen. But vacation properties have the same drawback as all real estate investments: real estate is immobile. If you must to sell it quickly, the price must be low. You probably can’t sell it yourself, because you’re not there.

Ownership of most objects becomes undesirable. Our family situations change. Rising fortunes suggest that we should upgrade. Declining fortunes require that we sell. Seclusion that initially provided peace now brings feelings of loneliness. Or seclusion is ruined by the tasteless vacation home just built next door. The only time available to be at the vacation property is consumed with mowing and repairs.

Now is a great time to buy, because many owners need to sell. Get some advice about your purchase from people who aren’t going to make a commission if the sale goes through, whom you can confide in about your needs.

The advisors you need when considering purchasing vacation property should be able to advise you on such topics as:

  • the history of the project (subdivision, resort, condominium), including the reputation of its developer
  • subdivision restrictions and plats
  • maintenance fees
  • responsibility for road maintenance
  • recreational amenities
  • water and sewer systems
  • lake or river access
  • police and fire protection
  • homeowner association status and activities
  • distance to medical facilities
  • resale opportunities
  • nearby employment opportunities

The information that you need probably isn’t available from just one person. Take your time in making a decision. Don’t sign anything while you’re in the wistful state.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Coverdell decision set aside, as Branson Landing case goes back to trial court

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Using the “plain error” doctrine, rarely used in civil cases, the Court of Appeals for the Southern District of Missouri, in Empire District Electric Co. v. Coverdell, reversed and remanded a January 14, 2010 jury verdict that had awarded Douglas Coverdell and Coverdell Enterprises the north third of Branson Landing and adjacent areas. This decision is dated June 3, 2011.

The appellate decision is based on the City of Branson’s argument that the trial court made a serious mistake by allowing the jury to enter a verdict affecting the property interests of the City of Branson (and others) who did not participate in the trial.  The appellate court accepted the City’s argument that “plain error review” would be appropriate, because the court’s error was “so egregious as to ‘weaken the very foundation of the process’ and ‘seriously undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.’ ” Empire’s appellate arguments were not addressed in the decision, according to a footnote, since the court’s acceptance of the City’s arguments was sufficient to warrant reversal.

The City of Branson did not participate in the trial held in January 2010, though the City’s attorney was present in the gallery of the court room for much of the trial. In an earlier phase of the case, which took place in 2004, the City had won its effort of affirm its title to the west portion of the peninsula shared with North Beach Park. Thereafter, the City was in a monitoring mode, not aware that title to the City’s land, leased to Branson Landing, would be the subject of the trial.

The appellate court tied its decision to the words of Coverdell’s attorney, spoken to the jury, who told the jury in the January 2010 trial that the dispute with Empire concerned only the east part of the North Park Beach peninsula. Coverdell’s attorney is also quoted as telling the jury that the City “has nothing to do with this dispute between Empire and [Coverdell and Coverdell Enterprises.]“

However, the judgment that Coverdell’s attorneys submitted to the trial judge after the juy verdict included 27 acres that included the Belk store and parking lot at the between North Beach Park and the Belk store, as well as some of the area south and west of the Belk store. The trial court’s mistake was to cloud the title of the City and others who were did not participate in the 2010 trial. The owners of much of the 27 acres were not parties to the suit, which appears to be the fundamental reason for reversal of the trial court’s judgment. The appellate opinion refers to City’s statement that the City “as well as numerous other third parties, have interests in that southern tract of land such that Branson was aggrieved by the 2010 judgment.”

The appellate decision gives the City and Empire the right to amend their claims and face Coverdell in a new trial.

Pondering intentional flooding: why are we in this mess?

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The random aspect of tornado damage is one thing. But people have put themselves in the paths of floodwaters. Now the Missouri River’s flood is moving downstream. Who knows what it will do to the Mississippi?

But can you blame people for building homes and businesses in the floodplains? We spent billions to control our rivers and create an economy that depends on our controlling them.

Have we lost the ability to manage our environment, or we were just kidding ourselves that our engineering ability (incorporating politically-mandated compromises) would be effective?

I ponder these things in a longish essay: Unnatural disasters: flooding from managed rivers and what to do. Of course, I don’t know what to do. Maybe you have an idea.

Please read and comment.

Can a city’s utility charges be a tax? It’s a tough case to prove.

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The City of Hermann provides water, sewer, natural gas, electricity and trash pickup to its residents, allowing them no choice of providers. When the City jacked up the rates and transferred the “profits” to other City accounts, some residents resented the City’s flexing of its monopoly power. They sued, claiming that the City’s governing board had sidestepped Missouri’s constitutional requirement (Article X, sections 16- 24, known as the Hancock Amendment) that tax increases be approved by voters. The court had to decide whether a utility rate increase was a disguised tax.

Here’s an overview of the Missouri Supreme Court’s 26-page opinion in Arbor Investtment Company LLC v. City of Hermann, released May 31, 2011, in which the court determined that the  City of Hermann’s utility fees were not taxes.

The Five (or Six or Seven) Factors

The Missouri Supreme Court identified five factors in the 1991 case Keller v. Marion County Ambulance District which may be applied to distinguish user fees (not requiring a vote of the people) from a tax (which requires a vote). These factors, the court pointed out, are not exhaustive, but provide a framework for analysis:

  1. When is the fee paid?
  2. Who pays the fee?
  3. Is the amount of the fee affected by the level of the service that it is for?
  4. Is the fee for a good or a service?
  5. Is the good or service one that has been historically provided by the government?

The City of Hermann’s utility charges are paid in response to monthly billing, after the services have been metered. This resembles a user charge, rather than a tax that is paid annually. Of course, it also resembles a sales tax that is paid upon a sale.

The City’s utility charges are assessed only against utility customers, unlike some kinds of taxes, which are charged without reference to who is using government services. For example, sales taxes are charged to non-resident and residents alike.

The amount of the City’s utility charges, at least above minimums and flat charges, is related directly to use, other than for Hermann’s “communications fee,” which is used to support the 911 network.

The City’s utility charges fees are imposed for goods or services, rather than being a general tax to be used however the City government chooses. This factor was not at issue in this challenge, though the plaintiffs claimed that the amount of the fees were in excess of the reasonable capital and operating costs incurred in providing the services.

The Supreme Court found the fifth factor in favor of a finding of a tax, though the City of Hermann has a long history of providing these services in Hermann. The court indicated that the City’s prohibition of any other provider offering these goods and services supports a finding that the utility charges are a tax, without explaining why, other than to state that the lack of alternatives was a part (a sixth factor?) of the analysis. Even so, a finding that the utility charges resembled a tax on this point was not enough to overcome the opposite findings on the other factors.

Borrowing from its opinion in Beatty v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, the court looked at a sixth factor, whether the payment was enforceable by imposition of a lien on the user’s property or merely by disconnection or discontinuance of the service. Without taking judicial notice of the fact that many if not most private and municipal utilities have the right to impose liens for non-payment of utility charges–in addition to disconnection– the court considered that a tax, such as a property tax, is secured by a lien, while utility providers have the right to disconnect the services to enforce payment.

The court upheld the City of Hermann’s utility rates, stating, “There simply has been no showing that the amount charged is so excessive as to not constitute the provision of a service or good in return for the amount paid.”

Municipal rates are unregulated, but does this lead to excessive rate levels?

We should be concerned with the quality of the facilities for providing our water supply, treatment and management of wastewater and stormwater, and delivery of electricity and telecommunications services. The infrastructure for these essential things was constructed in the 19th and 20th centuries. Repairing, replacing and upgrading them is enormously expensive and in many cases has been deferred.

But private and governmental providers face stiff resistance in raising revenues to confront these challenges. For many private providers, utility commissions determine the extent to which rate increases are allowed. For other providers, such as cooperatives, homeowner associations and local governments, rate increases are within the discretion of elected officials, who have wide discretion and motivations that may extend beyond the provision of utility services.

In my experience, local governments, looking at water and sewer rates, generally look around to neighboring communities and communities of the same size elsewhere in the state, hoping to stay somewhere below the top. While this strategy may be effective for helping elected officials to remain in office, it may not produce sufficient revenue for maintaining utility systems.

 

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