RSS Feed

Category Archives: real estate law

“Plus interest” is implied by court from contract for deed to defeat buyer’s claim

Posted on April 26, 2012 by Harry Styron

The contract for deed stated that the purchase price was $30,000, to be paid with $3,000 down and 144 monthly payments of $300. The buyers made 90 payments of $300, for a total of $27,000, and demanded a deed.

While the amount financed was stated to be $27,000, the product of 144 monthly payments of $300 would be $43,200.   On the seller’s motion for summary judgment, the trial judge held that the buyers were not entitled to the deed, because the contract required payment of 144 installments of $300, not 90 installments.

The Southern District Court of Appeals agreed  with the trial judge in Webbe v. Keel, stating:

It is not ambiguous for 144 monthly payments to exceed this contract’s sale price because the time value of money is a judicially-known concept.

Even though the contract did not specifically mention interest on the $27,000, the court apparently saw the buyer’s agreement to pay $16,200 in excess of the $27,000 balance over 12 years to be an agreement to pay interest.

Because the case involved contract interpretation, it could be ruled on by a judge without a trial on a motion for summary judgment, unless the trial judge found that the contract was ambiguous. If the trial judge found the contract to be ambiguous, a trial would be held to obtain evidence outside the text of the contract.

Many agreements to pay money over time that are prepared by amateurs fail to mention the interest rate, how interest is calculated (360-day year or 365-day year, compounding period), early payoff provisions and how payments are to be applied  (on day received or on first day of month if received by 5th, for example).

Webbe v. Keel shows how even a very simple contract can pull the parties into court.

 

Leave a comment

Posted in Missouri, Missouri law, real estate law and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Cassville Aldermen take on Cassville Board of Adjustment to challenge carport variance

Posted on March 22, 2012 by Harry Styron

It might seem odd to you that the Cassville board of aldermen would appeal a decision of the Cassville board of adjustment, since the board of aldermen appoints the members of the board of adjustment, and both boards are a part of the same city government. It seems odd to me that the point was not raised by the respondent on appeal.

Under Missouri statutes, boards of adjustments have some independence, and the appeal of the board of adjustment’s decision to grant a variance is the novel method that the Cassville board of aldermen chose to maintain the uniform application of their zoning regulations.

In Board of Aldermen of Cassville v. Board of Adjustment and Gerald Shaffer, nobody raised the question of whether the Board of Aldermen had the right to attempt to control the board of adjustment by appeal to circuit court. The Southern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the board of adjustment, with the effect of requiring Shaffer to remove the portion of his carport that extend over the setback line.

What are these boards?

A board of aldermen, under Missouri’s statutes for fourth-class cities, is the governing body of the city. It is the city’s legislative body, by adopting ordinances, and also the city’s executive branch, by giving orders to the mayor and city administrator. The mayor doesn’t even vote, except to break a tie.

The board of adjustment is authorized by Missouri’s planning and zoning statutes for cities, (Missouri counties have separate planning and zoning statutes) specifically sections 89. 080 through 89.110. Section 89.090 gives boards of adjustments three kinds of power:

  1. to hear and decide appeals of errors made by the planning and zoning staff,
  2. to hear and decide other appeals, as required by city ordinances, and
  3. to hear and decide applications for variances from the city’s codes relating to construction and alteration of buildings and the use of land.

The board of adjustment has the power to reverse, affirm or modify decisions of the planning and zoning board and its staff.

Under section 89,110, persons aggrieved by the decision of the board of adjustment may appeal the board’s decision to the circuit court of the county. Rather than hear evidence, the circuit court reviews the record of the proceedings of the board of adjustment, as though the circuit court were an appellate court.

Why did the Cassville board of aldermen take this matter so seriously?

Was the Cassville board of aldermen aggrieved by the decision of the board of adjustment to allow  Mr. Shaffer to have a carport that extended closer to his property line than the five feet allowed by Cassville zoning regulations?

In most challenges to the right of a party to appeal a board of adjustment’s decision, Missouri courts have been reluctant to give that right to just anyone who claims to be aggrieved. In other cases, neighbors who did not protest the decision at the board of adjustment hearing have been denied the right to appeal, as has a St. Louis alderwoman.

Regardless of the issue of whether the Cassville board of aldermen had the right to appeal the decision, the aldermen apparently wanted to hold the board of adjustment to compliance with the standards of the Cassville ordinances pertaining to variances.

Variances for structures and uses

Variances from strict application of zoning codes are allowed when the board of adjustment (or another board having such powers) has determined that the criteria for granting variances have been met. Cassville’s ordinances required that all five criteria contained in the ordinance be met, all highly subjective except that the hardship alleged to exist must not have been created by the owner or applicant and that the condition for which the variance is required must be unique to the property.

The Court of Appeals judges agreed with the Cassville aldermen’s contention that nothing about the Shaffer property was unique and that the alleged hardship–which was that visitors might have to walk to his door in the rain–was trivial.

 

Leave a comment

Posted in Ozarks economy, real estate development, real estate law, zoning and tagged , . Bookmark the permalink.

Subdivision developer gets nailed for assessments and has no special developer rights

Posted on February 16, 2012 by Harry Styron

Missouri Western District Court of Appeals just affirmed a trial court’s judgment in a way that will resound with homeowners’ association (HOA) boards across the state, many of which are struggling to raise sufficient revenues to take care of streets and amenities, even though many of the developer-owned lands that benefit from the streets are apparently exempt from assessments.

Lenders that have foreclosed on developers may find that this opinion undermines the lenders’ ability to claim to enjoy the developer’s exemption from assessments on lender-owned land. Parties purchasing land from lenders, hoping to have the status of the former developer, may find themselves heavily in debt to the HOA, perhaps blaming the lenders who sold them the land.

In Woodglen Estates Association v. Dulaney, Dulaney obtained 17 parcels of land from the FDIC. This land had once been owned the original developer Braeman, then passed through the hands of a few different parties, before ending up with the FDIC, which had taken the parcels of land from a failed bank.

The Woodglen Estates Association hired an auditor to review its finances. The auditor discovered that land owned by Dulaney had not been assessed for several years. The association then sued Dulaney, and Dulaney asserted two defenses:

  • As successor to the original developer, Dulaney should be exempt from assessments on land it owned.
  • Much of the land that Dulaney owned in Woodglen was in “parcels,” not having been subdivided into “units,” so that it should not be assessed.

The appellate court looked at the line of Missouri case law that holds that the special rights and privileges of a developer, typically reserved in the declaration of covenants for the subdivision, do not automatically pass with ownership of the developer’s real estate. These rights, called “developer rights,” “declarant rights” or “development rights,” may be assigned, but a party claiming to hold these rights has to be able to prove to have acquired them by assignment. Dulaney had no proof of assignment of declarant rights.

To make matters worse for Dulaney, the Woodglen declaration did not contain an exemption for the developer’s real estate–which is a common feature of declarations–and the appellate court noted that developers do not receive an automatic exemption. Under current Missouri law, other than in condominiums, a developer may lawfully reserve an exemption from assessment for its own real estate. The original developer simply failed to create the exemption when filing the declaration and made the mistake of including land in the declaration that was not ready to be developed.

Dulaney argument that its “parcels” were not subject to assessment, since only “units” and “unit owners’ could be assessed. The appellate court noted that some of the declaration’s provisions were ambiguous when addressing the respective rights of owners of units and parcels, but the assessment provisions were clear:  ”each owner shall be obligated to pay to the Board such sum as shall have been established….,” without distinguishing between owners of units and parcels. The legal description attached to the declaration had included Dulaney’s parcel, placing this land under the provision of the declaration.

For lenders, the lesson is that any loan documents for a development loan should include a security interest in the declarant rights, and any documents showing the recovery of the developer’s real estate should include a specific assignment of the declarant rights. When the lender sells the former developer’s property, the conveyances to the purchaser should include the assignment of declarant rights. These issues are covered in more detail in this essay.

Leave a comment

Posted in Missouri economy, Ozarks economy, real estate development, real estate law and tagged , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

HOA needs to get the owner’s name right to collect assessments

Posted on January 20, 2012 by Harry Styron

Whenever a homeowner association (HOA) gives me an account for collection, the first thing I do is verify the name in which the lot or unit is held. Frequently, the books of the HOA show owner as an individual or couple, often with a nickname.

Failure to keep track of the name in which property is held can defeat a claim for assessments, as shown in River Oaks Homes Association v. Lounce, a case that originated in Jackson County, Missouri.

The HOA obtained a judgment against Zeria Lounce, individually and as trustee of her living trust, for several years’ worth of delinquent assessments. Lounce appealed to the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in finding her personally liable and in finding the trust liable.

The River Oaks covenants provided that assessments were secured by a lien against the lot assessed and were also a personal obligation of  ”the person who was the Owner of such property at the time when the assessment fell due.” Fifteen months after purchasing her townhouse in River Oaks in 1993, Lounce conveyed it to her living trust, with herself as trustee.

Nobody paid the assessments after 2004, and the HOA sued Lounce in her individual capacity. After filing suit, the HOA discovered that Lounce had put the property in the name of her trust and added Lounce, as trustee, as a defendant in the suit. Because the covenant provided for the personal liability of the Owner only, the court of appeals reversed the judgment against Lounce, as an individual.

The court of appeals didn’t let the trust off the hook, stating that the payment obligation ran with the ownership of the property, regardless of whether the HOA was aware of the change in ownership.

Here are the lessons for associations:

  • Pay attention to the county records of ownership. The county assessors’ websites (in most counties in Missouri) are a fairly reliable place to look for the names in which property is held; the recorder’s office is the best authority, though not always the most accessible online. This is important for making sure the proper parties are casting votes in elections, as well as for collections.
  • Ask your collection agency or lawyer to confirm the owners’ identities when preparing liens, sending demand letters and filing collection suits.

Carelessness about ownership can result in the loss of the ability to collect, shifting the burdens to the paying members of the HOA.

 

 

1 Comment

Posted in homeowner association, Missouri economy, real estate law and tagged , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Appellate court can’t rescue City of Monett from legal screw-ups

Posted on June 30, 2011 by Harry Styron

Appellate courts sometimes seem to make an extra effort to protect small towns and cities from the effects of unwise or unpopular decisions, if the governing body acted in good faith for what the officials believed to be in the public interest. In Inman v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, the Southern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the City of Monett’s insurance company would not have to pay a claim made against Monett, after the Monett city attorney failed to inform the insurance company that the papers filed in the lawsuit by Inman had been changed to avoid an exclusion in the City’s insurance policy. Monett is left on its own in working out something with Inman.

Monett’s attempt to solve drainage problems

Monett attempted to solve a stormwater drainage problem in a subdivision by reconfiguring and paving a ditch that ran through part of the Inman property. After a flood while the construction was underway, Monett re-engineered the project and filed a condemnation suit to take and pay for a portion of the Inman property. Inman and Monett entered into a written settlement agreement and the condemnation suit was dismissed.  In the condemnation suit, necessarily, Monett claimed that the drainage project was for public benefit.

Insurance company kept in the dark

After the completion of the project, Inman sued Monett for trespass and damages to Inman’s property. Monett’s attorney contacted Monett’s insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire & Marine, and learned that Monett’s policy didn’t cover damages arising out of the exercise of normal governmental powers, such as taking property for public uses. Ten months later, Monett’s attorney notified St. Paul that a trial would be immediately taking place, not informing St. Paul Fire & Marine that Read the rest of this entry →

Leave a comment

Posted in Missouri, Missouri law, Ozarks economy, real estate law, water law (streams, lakes and groundwater) and tagged , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Coverdell decision set aside, as Branson Landing case goes back to trial court

Posted on June 7, 2011 by Harry Styron

Using the “plain error” doctrine, rarely used in civil cases, the Court of Appeals for the Southern District of Missouri, in Empire District Electric Co. v. Coverdell, reversed and remanded a January 14, 2010 jury verdict that had awarded Douglas Coverdell and Coverdell Enterprises the north third of Branson Landing and adjacent areas. This decision is dated June 3, 2011.

The appellate decision is based on the City of Branson’s argument that the trial court made a serious mistake by allowing the jury to enter a verdict affecting the property interests of the City of Branson (and others) who did not participate in the trial.  The appellate court accepted the City’s argument that “plain error review” would be appropriate, because the court’s error was “so egregious as to ‘weaken the very foundation of the process’ and ‘seriously undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.’ ” Empire’s appellate arguments were not addressed in the decision, according to a footnote, since the court’s acceptance of the City’s arguments was sufficient to warrant reversal.

The City of Branson did not participate in the trial held in January 2010, though the City’s attorney was present in the gallery of the court room for much of the trial. In an earlier phase of the case, which took place in 2004, the City had won its effort of affirm its title to the west portion of the peninsula shared with North Beach Park. Thereafter, the City was in a monitoring mode, not aware that title to the City’s land, leased to Branson Landing, would be the subject of the trial.

The appellate court tied its decision to the words of Coverdell’s attorney, spoken to the jury, who told the jury in the January 2010 trial that the dispute with Empire concerned only the east part of the North Park Beach peninsula. Coverdell’s attorney is also quoted as telling the jury that the City “has nothing to do with this dispute between Empire and [Coverdell and Coverdell Enterprises.]“

However, the judgment that Coverdell’s attorneys submitted to the trial judge after the juy verdict included 27 acres that included the Belk store and parking lot at the between North Beach Park and the Belk store, as well as some of the area south and west of the Belk store. The trial court’s mistake was to cloud the title of the City and others who were did not participate in the 2010 trial. The owners of much of the 27 acres were not parties to the suit, which appears to be the fundamental reason for reversal of the trial court’s judgment. The appellate opinion refers to City’s statement that the City “as well as numerous other third parties, have interests in that southern tract of land such that Branson was aggrieved by the 2010 judgment.”

The appellate decision gives the City and Empire the right to amend their claims and face Coverdell in a new trial.

Leave a comment

Posted in adverse possession, Branson, Branson-Missouri, economic development, Missouri economy, Missouri law, Ozarks economy, real estate law, Taney County, tourism and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Can a city’s utility charges be a tax? It’s a tough case to prove.

Posted on June 1, 2011 by Harry Styron

The City of Hermann provides water, sewer, natural gas, electricity and trash pickup to its residents, allowing them no choice of providers. When the City jacked up the rates and transferred the “profits” to other City accounts, some residents resented the City’s flexing of its monopoly power. They sued, claiming that the City’s governing board had sidestepped Missouri’s constitutional requirement (Article X, sections 16- 24, known as the Hancock Amendment) that tax increases be approved by voters. The court had to decide whether a utility rate increase was a disguised tax.

Here’s an overview of the Missouri Supreme Court’s 26-page opinion in Arbor Investtment Company LLC v. City of Hermann, released May 31, 2011, in which the court determined that the  City of Hermann’s utility fees were not taxes.

The Five (or Six or Seven) Factors

The Missouri Supreme Court identified five factors in the 1991 case Keller v. Marion County Ambulance District which may be applied to distinguish user fees (not requiring a vote of the people) from a tax (which requires a vote). These factors, the court pointed out, are not exhaustive, but provide a framework for analysis:

  1. When is the fee paid?
  2. Who pays the fee?
  3. Is the amount of the fee affected by the level of the service that it is for?
  4. Is the fee for a good or a service?
  5. Is the good or service one that has been historically provided by the government?

The City of Hermann’s utility charges are paid in response to monthly billing, after the services have been metered. This resembles a user charge, rather than a tax that is paid annually. Of course, it also resembles a sales tax that is paid upon a sale.

The City’s utility charges are assessed only against utility customers, unlike some kinds of taxes, which are charged without reference to who is using government services. For example, sales taxes are charged to non-resident and residents alike.

The amount of the City’s utility charges, at least above minimums and flat charges, is related directly to use, other than for Hermann’s “communications fee,” which is used to support the 911 network.

The City’s utility charges fees are imposed for goods or services, rather than being a general tax to be used however the City government chooses. This factor was not at issue in this challenge, though the plaintiffs claimed that the amount of the fees were in excess of the reasonable capital and operating costs incurred in providing the services.

The Supreme Court found the fifth factor in favor of a finding of a tax, though the City of Hermann has a long history of providing these services in Hermann. The court indicated that the City’s prohibition of any other provider offering these goods and services supports a finding that the utility charges are a tax, without explaining why, other than to state that the lack of alternatives was a part (a sixth factor?) of the analysis. Even so, a finding that the utility charges resembled a tax on this point was not enough to overcome the opposite findings on the other factors.

Borrowing from its opinion in Beatty v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, the court looked at a sixth factor, whether the payment was enforceable by imposition of a lien on the user’s property or merely by disconnection or discontinuance of the service. Without taking judicial notice of the fact that many if not most private and municipal utilities have the right to impose liens for non-payment of utility charges–in addition to disconnection– the court considered that a tax, such as a property tax, is secured by a lien, while utility providers have the right to disconnect the services to enforce payment.

The court upheld the City of Hermann’s utility rates, stating, “There simply has been no showing that the amount charged is so excessive as to not constitute the provision of a service or good in return for the amount paid.”

Municipal rates are unregulated, but does this lead to excessive rate levels?

We should be concerned with the quality of the facilities for providing our water supply, treatment and management of wastewater and stormwater, and delivery of electricity and telecommunications services. The infrastructure for these essential things was constructed in the 19th and 20th centuries. Repairing, replacing and upgrading them is enormously expensive and in many cases has been deferred.

But private and governmental providers face stiff resistance in raising revenues to confront these challenges. For many private providers, utility commissions determine the extent to which rate increases are allowed. For other providers, such as cooperatives, homeowner associations and local governments, rate increases are within the discretion of elected officials, who have wide discretion and motivations that may extend beyond the provision of utility services.

In my experience, local governments, looking at water and sewer rates, generally look around to neighboring communities and communities of the same size elsewhere in the state, hoping to stay somewhere below the top. While this strategy may be effective for helping elected officials to remain in office, it may not produce sufficient revenue for maintaining utility systems.

 

1 Comment

Posted in economic development, Missouri, Missouri economy, Ozarks, Ozarks economy, real estate law and tagged , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Missouri Supreme Court throws a lifeline to an HOA

Posted on April 20, 2011 by Harry Styron

If a homeowner association doesn’t have the power to impose liens to collect delinquent assessments for common expenses, the HOA is unable to perform its responsibilities. Often, no other entity has the legal authority to fill the gap in insuring, maintaining, repairing and replacing common properties such as streets, water and sewer facilities, clubhouses and pools, etc., which were the responsibility of the original HOA.

Many Missouri HOAs are dissolved by operation of law, having failed to file annual reports with the Missouri Secretary of State. Often a new HOA is formed, but a series of Missouri court decisions have made clear that the new HOAs lack any authority to perform the functions of the old HOA, unless there is an assignment of the old HOA’s powers to the new entity. I’ve summarized those court opinions here, including an update on Debaliviere Place Association v. Steven Veal, in which the Missouri Supreme Court reviewed a lower appellate court decision on April 12, 2011, changing the result and remanding the case for a new trial.

The Missouri Supreme Court’s opinion, written by Judge Michael A. Wolff, clarifies that a defunct HOA, even though it has been dissolved for more than 10 years, still has the power to assign its rights to collect assessments, impose liens and enforce covenants. This new opinion overruled a court of appeals opinion that had indicated that a defunct corporate HOA was a non-entity after it had been dissolved for 10 years, lacking the power to do anything. This new opinion is based on Missouri’s statute 355.691, which allows a dissolved non-profit corporation to “wind up and liquidate its affairs,” transferring its assets and liabilities.

Judge Wolff’s analysis limited the effect of a now repealed Missouri statute (section 355.507), which prohibited any non-profit corporation from coming back to life after it had been dissolved for at least 10 years, at which time its corporate charter is permanently forfeited. Even though the 10-year limit has been repealed, it still applies to many HOAs that had been dissolved before its repeal.

For new HOAs which need to establish their authority, the recording in the county land records of an assignment from the old HOA to the new HOA of the old HOAs powers will be effective, unless the objecting owner can prove that the assignment is made without authority, an a contention that Veal did not assert against Debaliviere.

5 Comments

Posted in homeowner association, Missouri law, real estate law and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Recording a real estate document gives notice, but lack of recording doesn’t?

Posted on April 13, 2011 by Harry Styron

By Missouri statute, the recording a document relating to real estate in the office of the county recorder of deeds gives notice to all of the contents of the recorded document (called an “instrument”):

Every such instrument in writing, certified and recorded in the manner herein prescribed, shall, from time of filing the same with the recorder for record, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof and all subsequent purchasers and mortgagees shall be deemed, in law and equity, to purchase with notice.

Is lack of recording notice that something did not occur, even though it should have been recorded?

According to the Missouri Court of Appeals, in the case Warren County Concrete v. Peoples Bank & Trust and Warren County Title Company,  purchaser of real estate had no duty to check to see whether a release of a deed of trust had been recorded, even though the purchaser had provided the money to pay off the deed of trust to a title company that closed the transaction.

The purchaser claimed to have no idea that the bank had not released the deed of trust until four years later, when the purchaser received a notice that the bank was foreclosing on the property. A year later — more than five years after the purchaser closed its purchase of the property — the purchaser filed a lawsuit against the bank and the title company, alleging that they were obligated to record the release.

The bank and title company claimed that the five-year statute of limitations period had run for negligence and breach of contract, and the purchaser was out of luck. The trial court agreed.

The purchaser appealed, claiming that the statute of limitations only began to run when the purchaser became aware that he had been wronged, which would have been the date the notice of foreclosure was delivered to the purchaser.

In the appeal, the bank and the title company argued that the purchaser should have checked the recorder’s office after the closing to make sure that the release had been recorded. The appeals court reversed the trial court’s judgment, stating that the burden of searching the public records after the closing was “a duty we are unwilling to place on the purchaser.”

The Court of Appeals was probably influenced by the injustice that would result when a purchaser hires a title company to close a transaction and provides money to pay off an existing loan, but the title company fails to follow up to make sure that the lender receives the payoff and records a proper release.

The Court of Appeals’ opinion isn’t specific about the reason for the mix-up, but it looks like the bank recorded a release after receiving the payoff, but that the release described a different piece of real estate than the piece that purchaser bought.

4 Comments

Posted in Missouri, Missouri economy, Ozarks economy, real estate development, real estate law and tagged , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Missouri hog farm flunks smell test, must pay $11 million to neighbors

Posted on March 31, 2011 by Harry Styron

I’ve heard that the vows of many vegetarians have been temporarily broken by the craving induced by the smell of bacon being cooked over a campfire.

But the process of creating bacon, ham and pork chops can create such awful odors that a Missouri jury awarded $11 million to those who could not escape the smell of hog farm effluent applied to neighboring fields.

Premium Standard Farms operates several hog farms in northern Missouri, where sparse population and proximity to feed grains hold costs down. These confinement feeding operations (CAFOs) produce lots of pork and staggering amounts of pungent effluent (urine and feces). PSF disposes of the effluent by tilling the fields around its hog houses and spraying the effluent into the air over the loosened soil. While the effluent is being sprayed (as much as 300 feet into the air) and as it soaks into the soil, it releases foul odors.

In one of many suits against PSF, sixty-one neighboring property owners sued PSF and its affilliates in 2002  for damages resulting from the bad smells wafting from PSF’s effluent application over an 11-year period ending in 2010. After much pretrial wrangling, with the plaintiffs being split up into groups based on distance from the hog farm, a four-week trial was held in Kansas City, and fifteen plaintiffs were awarded just over $11 million in compensatory damages.

The claims were made under the legal theory of temporary nuisance, which allows damages to be awarded if the plaintiffs can prove that the use of the defendant’s property was detrimental to the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs’ properties. Plaintiffs are not required to prove that their property values were permanently diminished by the nuisance, only that their use and enjoyment of their properties were harmed during the time of the nuisance.

PSF appealed the jury verdict, claiming six different errors, a couple of which are interesting. The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected all six. PSF’s most interesting arguments are:

  • owners of unoccupied farmland are not entitled to recover in a temporary nuisance suit because of their business use of their property.
  • the only measure of damages for loss of use of business property is the loss of  property value during the period of the nuisance, rather than whatever a jury thinks would compensate the owner for unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the owner’s property.

The law of nuisance grew out of the common law. For nearly 150 years, law students have been told about Rylands v. Fletcher, an 1868 decision of an English court that changed the law of nuisance by establishing strict liability of those who produce or harbor dangerous or noxious substances on their land. Those who have the bad stuff on their land can be liable to their neighbors if the bad stuff escapes, regardless of whether the escape of the bad stuff happened as a result of negligence.

State legislatures don’t like to adopt regulations that create liability for those who create lots of jobs and tax revenues, so it remains the job of judges and juries to fashion remedies for dealing with some kinds of pollution. The Court of Appeals rejected PSF’s analysis of case law, concluding

there is no persuasive reason that land used for business purposes could not support an award for the loss of the use and enjoyment of such property by the business owner…We refuse to say as a matter of law that the owners of farmland are not entitled to the reasonable use and enjoyment of that land merely because business activities are conducted on it.

CAFOs provide markets for feed grains raised by neighboring farmers. That’s why many CAFOs are located in areas of fertile soil and ample water. Neighbors to a CAFO are likely to be substantial farmers, some of whom produce grains that feed the CAFO’s poultry, cattle or hogs. Many of their farms are large and highly mechanized and often owned by farming corporations or limited liability companies. CAFOs support local economies, generating tax revenues, income and jobs, keeping alive communities that would otherwise continue to wither.

CAFOs also consume huge amounts of water that becomes effluent, the smell of which can make it impossible to be outside during and shortly after it is applied to fields. Under Missouri law, users of private wells pay nothing for the withdrawn water, even though the withdrawals deplete shared acquifers. In other words, CAFO operators, like other businesses, don’t want to bear all the costs of their activities, hoping that these costs can be spread over the larger community. The judicial system, applying the common law, still allows juries to force polluters to bear more of their social costs than the polluters would voluntarily accept.

Leave a comment

Posted in agriculture, Missouri, Missouri economy, Missouri law, nuisance, real estate law and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink.
← Older Posts
→
Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 83 other followers