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Category Archives: real estate law

Never mind, Missouri cities can charge different tap fees in different parts of town

Earlier this year, I wrote that the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals, in  City of Sullivan v. Sites,  had struck down an ordinance of the City of Sullivan that established a higher tap fee for connecting to the city’s sewer main in a particular part of town. The voters of the City of Sullivan had approved a $3.3 million bond issue to extend sewers to a part of  the city without sewer service. The city’s board  of aldermen adopted an ordinance imposing a connection fee in the newly-served area that was higher than the connection fee charged in the remainder of the city.

The Sites trust challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance establishing the higher connection fee, claiming that the ordinance violated Article III, section 40(30), which prohibited the passage of local or special laws where a general law would suffice. A general law relates to persons or things as a class, while a special or local law relates to particular persons or places.

However, Missouri Supreme Court’s opinion in City of Sullivan v. Sites, reversed the Court of Appeals decision and affirmed the trial court’s decision upholding the ordinance. The Supreme Court reviewed court decisions that recognize that prohibitions against special or local laws “should not prevent necessary geographic classifications premised on legitimate distinguish characteristics.” The Supreme Court determined that the Site trust’s property was not singled out, but was a part of a geographic area n area that was defined as a class.

The Supreme Court held that “the city was justified in creating the class of new sewer connections charged higher connection fees,” having demonstrated good financial and practical reasons for requiring property in the newly-served area, noting that the imposition of higher fees in the new area “contributed to the City’s ability to fund the sewer project as a whole.”

Offshore company loses assets, while hiding from liabilities

 

It’s great to be hard to find, but sometimes it causes you to lose stuff.

In the case of United Asset Management v. Clark, United lost its real estate in Cass County, Missouri, having failed to pay its taxes. If United hadn’t played hard to find, there’s a good chance that it would have received the notices from the county collector and from Clark, who bought the property at the collector’s sale.

This 40-page opinion of the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals adds detail to Missouri’s rapidly growing body of law that interprets the Jones-Munger Act, which is the collection of Missouri statutes that set out the procedure for collection of property taxes by counties through the advertisement and sale of delinquent real estate.

The Jones-Munger Act provides a period for a property owner to redeem property after somebody else has paid the taxes. The United States Constitution’s protection of property owners from confiscation without due process requires strict adherence to statutory procedures to assure that nobody loses their property without notice.

According to this opinion (and the precedents that it cites), when a county collector receives a tax statement that is stamped with “return to sender, undeliverable at this address, unable to forward,” the collector may be required to do more, rather than merely include the property in the collector’s sales, held in Missouri counties on the fourth Monday of each August.

Similarly, when the purchaser of a property at a tax sale applies for a collector’s deed, the purchaser must make a diligent effort to give notice to the property owner and any lienholders (such as those holding a mortgage on the property) that their redemption rights will expire.

Just what is required of the county collector and the tax sale purchaser depends on the circumstances, especially since the Jones v. Flowers decision of 2006, one of the first United Supreme Court opinions written by Chief Justice John Roberts. But Roberts wrote that the return of the envelope triggers a process that must be appropriate under the circumstances. For a tax collector or a purchaser of a tax certificate, it’s usually a good idea to:

  •  send a notice by regular mail, in addition to certified mail
  • send a notice addressed to “occupant”
  • knock on the door or post a notice, if there’s a building on the property
  • look in the phone book or call directory assistance
  • use an internet search engine
  • check property tax records (including vehicle records) for another address for the same party

I’ve been able to persuade courts to set aside collector’s deeds when the purchaser at tax sale couldn’t demonstrate diligence.

But United Asset Management Trust Company was too hard to find, which might be desirable for one wanting to avoid paying taxes and other debts. But United paid a price for being elusive.

United was the trustee for Coast to Coast Holding Company, which had no address in the United States, but was domiciled in Grand Turk, Caicos, British West Indies. Somewhere along the line, its Missouri post office box was cancelled, with no forwarding address. United Trust’s manager was in another state. The Cass County Collector was diligent, but couldn’t locate United, Neither could Clark, who bought the property at the collector’s tax sale. There was no building on the property and nowhere to post a notice.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court. The county collector and the purchaser at the tax sale did all that was reasonable and practical under the circumstances created by United. So United lost its real property for a few dollars in taxes.

My neighbor fenced in my backyard!

The rear of the Grossmans’ backyard had several trees and a culvert along the property line. When they put up a privacy fence in 1994, they didn’t enclose a nine-foot strip across the rear. The St. Johns moved into the house on the lot that shared the rear line of Grossmans’ lot in 2004, and the St. Johns began to maintain that nine-foot strip along with their own backyard, removing debris and even laying sod.

In 2008, the St. Johns fenced in their backyard and extended their fence across the nine-foot strip to a point five inches from the Grossmans’ fence. The Grossmans’ attorney sent a letter to the St. Johns, asking that they remove their fence and discontinue using the nine-foot strip.

The Grossmans sued the St. Johns for trespass, also asking for an injunction to force the St. Johns to remove the portion of the St. Johns’ fence on the Grossmans’ property. The St. Johns countersued, seeking reimbursement for their maintenance and repairs of the nine-foot strip.

Trespass under Missouri law, in a civil case, requires the plaintiff to prove unauthorized entry onto the property of another, regardless of damages and regardless of good faith, reasonable care, ignorance or mistake of law or fact.  Missouri law also allows the defense of consent of the complaining property owner, whose consent may be implied by custom, usage or conduct. Proof of damages resulting from the trespass is not required, but monetary damages can be recovered if proved.

At the trial, Mr. Grossman testified that he was aware that the St. Johns installed solar lights, plants and concrete benches on the nine-foot strip and admitted that it didn’t bother him. The St. Johns argued that this admission was proof of implied consent.

The trial court found for the St. Johns on the trespass charge, apparently accepting the argument of implied consent. The trial court also rejected the St. Johns’ counterclaim for reimbursement of their costs of repairs and maintenance. The Grossmans appealed; the St. Johns did not.

The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals in Grossman v. St. John reverses the trial court, stating that the judgment in favor of the St. Johns on the injunction and trespass claims was “against the weight of the evidence and was erroneous.”

In other words, there was inadequate evidence in the record of the trial to show that the Grossmans had consented to the erection of the fence, even though they may have initially consented to the use of the nine-foot strip by the St. Johns. That consent was revoked by the letter from Grossmans’ lawyer. By ignoring the undisputed revocation of consent, the judge made an error.

Please note that the use of Grossmans’ property by the St. Johns only lasted for four years. Had the use continued for 10 years, the St. Johns would not have been arguing consent–they would state that they used the property openly and without consent, thereby entitling them to title by adverse possession. The Grossmans’ suit was necessary to protect their property from such a claim.

Partition: not always an equal division of real estate

No house is big enough for two couples, my mother told me long ago. Especially when one couple pays for nearly everything.

When the non-paying couple asked the court to divide the house, a Missouri court left them out in the cold. They appealed, and the court’s decision in Hoit v. Rankin indicates Read the rest of this entry

Purchase option is assignable without consent, but there can still be a fight

The Hulls signed a real estate lease with a purchase option and put down a deposit of $56,000, which could be applied to the $198,500 purchase price, but would otherwise be non-refundable. The Hulls created a limited liability company (LLC) called Briar Road, and Briar Road attempted to exercise the purchase option. Stenger, the seller, refused, claiming that it had not approved the assignment of the purchase option by the Hulls to Briar Road.

What difference does the identity of the purchaser make? Read the rest of this entry

Real estate tax in the health care bill?

I received an email from a Realtor friend which included some strong rhetoric about the 3.8% tax on gains from the sale of residential real estate included in the new health care law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act.

The point of the quoted rhetoric was to fuel voter sentiment against Democrats running for Congress in November by alleging that the bill is “set to screw the Read the rest of this entry

Who owns abandoned public roads in Missouri?

As Missouri’s public roads have been straightened, many odd kinks of roadway are left over, along with triangles of land between the old roads and the new roads. As we drive, we see these pieces of the old roads, sometimes serving as frontage roads along divided highways. In some cases, such as in McCullough v. Doss and Allen, the triangle on the west side of the new road was sold to McCullough, even though they might have been able to claim that at least the west half of the abandoned right-of-way of the old public road was theirs. Here’s an image from the Stone County Assessor’s maps:

The State of Missouri built Highway 39 in the mid-1950s, mainly along an old public road. At the point shown in the image, the severe dogleg Read the rest of this entry

The defunct HOA problem continues in Missouri, legislation needed urgently

Homeowner associations (HOAs) are given responsibility by recorded subdivision and condominium documents for maintaining, insuring and operating private communities’ common properties, such as streets, drinking water systems, sewer collection and treatment systems, and recreation facilities.

With many developers having abandoned projects before the HOA is operated by residents, the residents and other lot or unit owners (such as lenders that have foreclosed) are often faced with HOAs that cannot properly Read the rest of this entry

Arkansas’s high court says an affidavit of lost mortgage is notice of nothing

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You can ignore an affidavit of lost mortgage in Arkansas. Is this news you can use?

Maybe not, but there’s still a lesson in Wetzel v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., a May 20, 2010 decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court.

The lesson is Read the rest of this entry

All owners are necessary parties in condominium litigation when class action fails

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The Villa Dorado condominium has 45 buildings, only nine of which have elevators. When the condominium association’s board assessed every unit owner for repairs to elevators, Epstein and Root protested. Their units were in buildings with no elevators, Read the rest of this entry

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