Category Archives: Missouri law

Appellate court can’t rescue City of Monett from legal screw-ups


Appellate courts sometimes seem to make an extra effort to protect small towns and cities from the effects of unwise or unpopular decisions, if the governing body acted in good faith for what the officials believed to be in the public interest. In Inman v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, the Southern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the City of Monett’s insurance company would not have to pay a claim made against Monett, after the Monett city attorney failed to inform the insurance company that the papers filed in the lawsuit by Inman had been changed to avoid an exclusion in the City’s insurance policy. Monett is left on its own in working out something with Inman.

Monett’s attempt to solve drainage problems

Monett attempted to solve a stormwater drainage problem in a subdivision by reconfiguring and paving a ditch that ran through part of the Inman property. After a flood while the construction was underway, Monett re-engineered the project and filed a condemnation suit to take and pay for a portion of the Inman property. Inman and Monett entered into a written settlement agreement and the condemnation suit was dismissed.  In the condemnation suit, necessarily, Monett claimed that the drainage project was for public benefit.

Insurance company kept in the dark

After the completion of the project, Inman sued Monett for trespass and damages to Inman’s property. Monett’s attorney contacted Monett’s insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire & Marine, and learned that Monett’s policy didn’t cover damages arising out of the exercise of normal governmental powers, such as taking property for public uses. Ten months later, Monett’s attorney notified St. Paul that a trial would be immediately taking place, not informing St. Paul Fire & Marine that Read the rest of this entry

Invest now in vacation property!


In preparing for a short talk about how to convey various kinds of vacation real estate, I arrived at the unbrilliant conclusion that people make decisions to buy vacation real estate (RV lots, lake houses, timeshares) based on what they think they want at the time of purchase, with some attention, but not enough attention, to the future. A short version of my presentation is posted here.

Many decisions to purchase vacation property are made when buyers are in a state of vacation bliss, a kind of wistfulness, that makes them less critical than when they’re on their home turf. They hope the vacation property will be a place of togetherness for family and close friends, where memories are created. Perhaps it will become a retirement home, where the grandchildren will want to visit. The sales techniques for vacation property are addressed squarely at those sentiments.

Many of those good things do happen. But vacation properties have the same drawback as all real estate investments: real estate is immobile. If you must to sell it quickly, the price must be low. You probably can’t sell it yourself, because you’re not there.

Ownership of most objects becomes undesirable. Our family situations change. Rising fortunes suggest that we should upgrade. Declining fortunes require that we sell. Seclusion that initially provided peace now brings feelings of loneliness. Or seclusion is ruined by the tasteless vacation home just built next door. The only time available to be at the vacation property is consumed with mowing and repairs.

Now is a great time to buy, because many owners need to sell. Get some advice about your purchase from people who aren’t going to make a commission if the sale goes through, whom you can confide in about your needs.

The advisors you need when considering purchasing vacation property should be able to advise you on such topics as:

  • the history of the project (subdivision, resort, condominium), including the reputation of its developer
  • subdivision restrictions and plats
  • maintenance fees
  • responsibility for road maintenance
  • recreational amenities
  • water and sewer systems
  • lake or river access
  • police and fire protection
  • homeowner association status and activities
  • distance to medical facilities
  • resale opportunities
  • nearby employment opportunities

The information that you need probably isn’t available from just one person. Take your time in making a decision. Don’t sign anything while you’re in the wistful state.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Coverdell decision set aside, as Branson Landing case goes back to trial court

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Using the “plain error” doctrine, rarely used in civil cases, the Court of Appeals for the Southern District of Missouri, in Empire District Electric Co. v. Coverdell, reversed and remanded a January 14, 2010 jury verdict that had awarded Douglas Coverdell and Coverdell Enterprises the north third of Branson Landing and adjacent areas. This decision is dated June 3, 2011.

The appellate decision is based on the City of Branson’s argument that the trial court made a serious mistake by allowing the jury to enter a verdict affecting the property interests of the City of Branson (and others) who did not participate in the trial.  The appellate court accepted the City’s argument that “plain error review” would be appropriate, because the court’s error was “so egregious as to ‘weaken the very foundation of the process’ and ‘seriously undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.’ ” Empire’s appellate arguments were not addressed in the decision, according to a footnote, since the court’s acceptance of the City’s arguments was sufficient to warrant reversal.

The City of Branson did not participate in the trial held in January 2010, though the City’s attorney was present in the gallery of the court room for much of the trial. In an earlier phase of the case, which took place in 2004, the City had won its effort of affirm its title to the west portion of the peninsula shared with North Beach Park. Thereafter, the City was in a monitoring mode, not aware that title to the City’s land, leased to Branson Landing, would be the subject of the trial.

The appellate court tied its decision to the words of Coverdell’s attorney, spoken to the jury, who told the jury in the January 2010 trial that the dispute with Empire concerned only the east part of the North Park Beach peninsula. Coverdell’s attorney is also quoted as telling the jury that the City “has nothing to do with this dispute between Empire and [Coverdell and Coverdell Enterprises.]”

However, the judgment that Coverdell’s attorneys submitted to the trial judge after the juy verdict included 27 acres that included the Belk store and parking lot at the between North Beach Park and the Belk store, as well as some of the area south and west of the Belk store. The trial court’s mistake was to cloud the title of the City and others who were did not participate in the 2010 trial. The owners of much of the 27 acres were not parties to the suit, which appears to be the fundamental reason for reversal of the trial court’s judgment. The appellate opinion refers to City’s statement that the City “as well as numerous other third parties, have interests in that southern tract of land such that Branson was aggrieved by the 2010 judgment.”

The appellate decision gives the City and Empire the right to amend their claims and face Coverdell in a new trial.

Missouri Supreme Court throws a lifeline to an HOA


If a homeowner association doesn’t have the power to impose liens to collect delinquent assessments for common expenses, the HOA is unable to perform its responsibilities. Often, no other entity has the legal authority to fill the gap in insuring, maintaining, repairing and replacing common properties such as streets, water and sewer facilities, clubhouses and pools, etc., which were the responsibility of the original HOA.

Many Missouri HOAs are dissolved by operation of law, having failed to file annual reports with the Missouri Secretary of State. Often a new HOA is formed, but a series of Missouri court decisions have made clear that the new HOAs lack any authority to perform the functions of the old HOA, unless there is an assignment of the old HOA’s powers to the new entity. I’ve summarized those court opinions here, including an update on Debaliviere Place Association v. Steven Veal, in which the Missouri Supreme Court reviewed a lower appellate court decision on April 12, 2011, changing the result and remanding the case for a new trial.

The Missouri Supreme Court’s opinion, written by Judge Michael A. Wolff, clarifies that a defunct HOA, even though it has been dissolved for more than 10 years, still has the power to assign its rights to collect assessments, impose liens and enforce covenants. This new opinion overruled a court of appeals opinion that had indicated that a defunct corporate HOA was a non-entity after it had been dissolved for 10 years, lacking the power to do anything. This new opinion is based on Missouri’s statute 355.691, which allows a dissolved non-profit corporation to “wind up and liquidate its affairs,” transferring its assets and liabilities.

Judge Wolff’s analysis limited the effect of a now repealed Missouri statute (section 355.507), which prohibited any non-profit corporation from coming back to life after it had been dissolved for at least 10 years, at which time its corporate charter is permanently forfeited. Even though the 10-year limit has been repealed, it still applies to many HOAs that had been dissolved before its repeal.

For new HOAs which need to establish their authority, the recording in the county land records of an assignment from the old HOA to the new HOA of the old HOAs powers will be effective, unless the objecting owner can prove that the assignment is made without authority, an a contention that Veal did not assert against Debaliviere.

Contract protects self-storage company from liability for roof leak


Surely, a self-storage company would be responsible for damage to stored goods if the storage company neglected its roof, allowing water leaks.

John Easley, who represented himself, found out that the not-so-fine print left him with damaged goods, a worthless insurance policy and a big disappointment.

When Easley placed his furniture in AAA Mini Storage, he signed the usual forms that state that the warehouse owner is not responsible for damages and that the tenant is responsible for insuring the stored goods against damage.

Two years later, Easley found that rain had leaked into the storage unit and puddled against the back wall of the unit, leaving his goods damaged by moisture and mold. He made a claim on his insurance policy. The insurance adjuster said that negligent maintenance of the roof caused Easley’s loss, which was an exclusion from coverage.

Easley sued AAA Mini Storage in small claims court in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and lost. He then took advantage of the Missouri law that allows losers in small claims court to have a new trial in associate circuit court.

This time Easley won. The judge agreed that the release of liability that Easley signed did not excuse AAA Mini Storage’s implicit obligation to maintain its roof. AAA Mini Storage appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals.

Easley didn’t file a legal brief in the appeal, which may have been a mistake. The appellate opinion, Easley v. Gray Wolf Investments, agreed with the storage company’s legal argument:

Missouri law recognizes that a contract may eliminate liability for future negligence if the release is clear, unambiguous, unmistakable, and in conspicuous language.

The appellate judges reviewed the release of liability and found it was clearly and simply written and that its language was conspicuous, since some of it was in all capital letters.

The appellate judges also found that Easley was “a relatively sophisticated party,” because “he was building a 2,613-square-foot home with a walk-out basement.” Is this wisdom or what? Wow, a walk-out basement!

Not all releases of future liability are enforceable. Lawyers, for example, are prohibited by the Code of Professional Conduct from entering into contracts that release them from liability for their future negligence.

According to the Court of Appeals, Missourians need to make sure that their self-storage contracts include a clause requiring the storage company to repair leaks in their roofs. If the storage company won’t agree to change its form just for you, you can haul your stuff to a different place, perhaps Illinois.

Missouri hog farm flunks smell test, must pay $11 million to neighbors


I’ve heard that the vows of many vegetarians have been temporarily broken by the craving induced by the smell of bacon being cooked over a campfire.

But the process of creating bacon, ham and pork chops can create such awful odors that a Missouri jury awarded $11 million to those who could not escape the smell of hog farm effluent applied to neighboring fields.

Premium Standard Farms operates several hog farms in northern Missouri, where sparse population and proximity to feed grains hold costs down. These confinement feeding operations (CAFOs) produce lots of pork and staggering amounts of pungent effluent (urine and feces). PSF disposes of the effluent by tilling the fields around its hog houses and spraying the effluent into the air over the loosened soil. While the effluent is being sprayed (as much as 300 feet into the air) and as it soaks into the soil, it releases foul odors.

In one of many suits against PSF, sixty-one neighboring property owners sued PSF and its affilliates in 2002  for damages resulting from the bad smells wafting from PSF’s effluent application over an 11-year period ending in 2010. After much pretrial wrangling, with the plaintiffs being split up into groups based on distance from the hog farm, a four-week trial was held in Kansas City, and fifteen plaintiffs were awarded just over $11 million in compensatory damages.

The claims were made under the legal theory of temporary nuisance, which allows damages to be awarded if the plaintiffs can prove that the use of the defendant’s property was detrimental to the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs’ properties. Plaintiffs are not required to prove that their property values were permanently diminished by the nuisance, only that their use and enjoyment of their properties were harmed during the time of the nuisance.

PSF appealed the jury verdict, claiming six different errors, a couple of which are interesting. The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected all six. PSF’s most interesting arguments are:

  • owners of unoccupied farmland are not entitled to recover in a temporary nuisance suit because of their business use of their property.
  • the only measure of damages for loss of use of business property is the loss of  property value during the period of the nuisance, rather than whatever a jury thinks would compensate the owner for unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the owner’s property.

The law of nuisance grew out of the common law. For nearly 150 years, law students have been told about Rylands v. Fletcher, an 1868 decision of an English court that changed the law of nuisance by establishing strict liability of those who produce or harbor dangerous or noxious substances on their land. Those who have the bad stuff on their land can be liable to their neighbors if the bad stuff escapes, regardless of whether the escape of the bad stuff happened as a result of negligence.

State legislatures don’t like to adopt regulations that create liability for those who create lots of jobs and tax revenues, so it remains the job of judges and juries to fashion remedies for dealing with some kinds of pollution. The Court of Appeals rejected PSF’s analysis of case law, concluding

there is no persuasive reason that land used for business purposes could not support an award for the loss of the use and enjoyment of such property by the business owner…We refuse to say as a matter of law that the owners of farmland are not entitled to the reasonable use and enjoyment of that land merely because business activities are conducted on it.

CAFOs provide markets for feed grains raised by neighboring farmers. That’s why many CAFOs are located in areas of fertile soil and ample water. Neighbors to a CAFO are likely to be substantial farmers, some of whom produce grains that feed the CAFO’s poultry, cattle or hogs. Many of their farms are large and highly mechanized and often owned by farming corporations or limited liability companies. CAFOs support local economies, generating tax revenues, income and jobs, keeping alive communities that would otherwise continue to wither.

CAFOs also consume huge amounts of water that becomes effluent, the smell of which can make it impossible to be outside during and shortly after it is applied to fields. Under Missouri law, users of private wells pay nothing for the withdrawn water, even though the withdrawals deplete shared acquifers. In other words, CAFO operators, like other businesses, don’t want to bear all the costs of their activities, hoping that these costs can be spread over the larger community. The judicial system, applying the common law, still allows juries to force polluters to bear more of their social costs than the polluters would voluntarily accept.

A couple of big firms start blogging about Missouri law


Most lawyers practice in small firms, which may be why most lawyers who write blogs are in solo or small-firm practices. Marketing consultants to the legal industry have been pushing blogging for several years, and now more attorneys from large firms are getting into the act. I’ve added three blogs written by large-firm lawyers to Read the rest of this entry

Glaize Creek Sewer District blows condemnation case, but gets new chance


At a condemnation trial, Glaize Creek Sewer District (in Jefferson County, Missouri, just south of St. Louis), didn’t put on any admissible evidence of damages to the Gorhams’ property. The Gorhams put on proper evidence of damages, showing that the value of their property after the sewer line was installed declined by $29,000. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict of zero damages (based on an appraiser‘s unsubstantiated opinion testimony), and sent the case back for a new trial.

Two things are unusual about this case: Read the rest of this entry

Hate unions, but love your occupational license?


The decline of union membership and public support for labor unions has corresponded rather precisely to the rise in the percentage of Americans who hold occupational licenses.

Occupational licensing would not have grown without broad support. Here’s an economist’s explanation of why:

Governmental officials benefit from Read the rest of this entry

“Taxpayer” loses property to city of St. Louis


Four justices of the  Missouri Supreme Court wouldn’t help Bhatti recover his property, which had been sold by the City of St. Louis in an effort to collect Bhatti’s delinquent property taxes. These justices reckoned that Bhatti was obligated to know whether letters that he never received were reasonably calculated to reach him and inform him that he was losing his property.

The court’s majority opinion pointed out crucial facts that kept the court from applying the due process rules which were set out by the United States Supreme Court in a series of decisions, most recently in Jones v. Flowers, a 2006 decision.

At trial, Bhatti failed to provide evidence to indicate that the sheriff had reason to know that the mailed notices were not reaching Bhatti.

In a motion for a new trial  based on newly discovered evidence,  Bhatti provided the envelopes marked “return to sender” which the sheriff’s office had received. Bhatti’s motion for a new trial was rejected, because Bhatti did not show the court that the returned envelopes were not available at the time of the first trial.

Bhatti also argued that the evidence of the returned notices to him were a part of the fat file that was included in the trial exhibits. The Missouri Supreme Court stated that the trial court was under no obligation to sort through a fat file to find documents that would help Bhatti — it was up to Bhatti (or his attorney) to call the trial judge’s attention to specific documents that would support Bhatti’s case.

In its conclusion, the Missouri Supreme Court lectured Bhatti on three points, only one of which is based on law (which I have put into separate paragraphs):

The Court regrets the result in this case. But Owner’s loss of his real estate is the result of his multiple acts of negligence.

  • First, he was negligent in failing to pay his real estate taxes for three years…
  • Second, Owner provided an incorrect address for the purpose of notification of real estate taxes due, and he never updated his address….
  • Third, when pursuing his constitutional rights in our court system, he failed to follow United Supreme Court authority that requires him to show that the notice sent to him was not reasonably calculated to apprise him of the pendency of the action against him.

The lessons from this lecture are clear:

  • If you own property and are not receiving a tax bill for it, you need to contact the tax collector.
  • The Missouri Supreme Court expects a person to know whether or not a notice not received is “reasonably calculated to apprise him of the pendency of the action.”

Negligence of the property owner is not a part of the constitutional law in due process cases. The court’s remarks about Bhatti’s negligence are gratuitous, but perhap provide a moral underpinning to the dissent’s position that focused on the City’s lack of effort in getting notices to Bhatti.

Justice Wolff’s dissent, supported by justices Stith and Teitelman, notes that the government spent a total of $1.28 in postage to send notices to Bhatti, even though the government is obligated to send notices that are “reasonably calculated to apprise him of the judgment of foreclosure, the forclosure sale and the confirmation hearing.” The government knew that Bhatti didn’t receive the notices, but still sold Bhatti’s property to collect $7,600 in taxes.

The City of St. Louis had another address for Bhatti, which Bhatti used on his building permit applications. Wolff indicated that the City should have also sent a notice to this alternate address, rather than only to the vacant building which Bhatti was fixing up.

Wolff also argues that the City’s tax lien foreclosure ordinances, as implemented, do not provide due process.The City, having the returned mail sent to Bhatti, should not benefit from the presumption that mail has been received.