Category Archives: real estate law

Missouri judges have discretion in creating private road maintenance plans

Posted on October 4, 2018 by Harry Styron

In 2012, the Missouri General Assembly gave circuit court judges the ability to create road maintenance plans over shared private roads under some circumstances, enacting what is now section 228.369 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri. I wrote about the promises of this legislation when it was enacted, pointing out some of its features and limitations. Now we have the first appellate decision concerning this statute, which indicates that judges in trial courts can exercise discretion in:

  • the manner in which assessments for road maintenance are allocated among the property owners who use the road
  • designating which portions of a road are to be maintained by particular classes of property owners.

The case is Stieren v.  Grothaus, which arose in Jefferson County, Missouri, where Sugar Mountain Road ran from a public road a distance of 713 feet to the Caress home. Later, Fordee Ridge Estates subdivision was created, and Sugar Mountain Road was extended another 3,207 feet to provide access to and from the lots in Fordee Ridge Estates.

The judge in the trial court ordered that the Caress property would be responsible only for the 713-foot portion of the road, (which the appellate opinion refers to as the “Entrance and Hill”) while the owners of lots in Fordee Ridge Estates would be responsible for the Entrance and Hill, plus the 3,207 portion of Sugar Mountain Road (referred to as the “Subdivision Road.”). Some Fordee Ridge owners were unhappy with the trial court’s order and appealed, claiming that:

  • the court erred in apportioning the maintenance costs for the Subdivision Road equally among the Fordee Ridge Estates owners, omitting the Caress property owners whose properties were not in the Fordee Ridge Estates subdivision, and
  • the court was without authority to divide Sugar Mountain Road into two sections (the Entrance and Hill section and the Subdivision Road section).

The appellate court pointed out that the language in section 228.369.2 gives the trial court the discretion to apportion the road maintenance costs “commensurate with the use and benefit to the residences benefitted by the access” by various methods, “including, but not limited to equal division, or proportionate to the residential assessed value, or to front footage, or to usage or benefit.” Thus the court’s apparent conclusion that Caress property outside the subdivision did not benefit at all from the Subdivision Road was justified on the basis of evidence of use and availability for use by mail trucks and emergency vehicles.

Even though the use by Fordee Ridge Estates owners was not equal, the appellate court noted that it “was reasonable for the the trial court to find that the very existence of a road providing access confers the same benefit to all properties: access.”

On the issue of whether the trial court was authorized to divide Sugar Mountain Road into to portions for the purpose of allocating the financial responsibility for maintenance, the appellate court looked at the evidence that the Entrance and Hill portion was built and used earlier and that the Caress properties did not use or benefit from the Subdivision Road, built later as an extension of the original Sugar Mountain Road. The appellate court concluded under these facts, “[t]he only way to apportion costs commensurate with these findings was for the trial court to establish a separate assessment for each portion of the road.”

The appellate decision should give trial judges confidence that they can take evidence and essentially force a maintenance contract on those who benefit from a private road that falls under section 228.369, with the method of allocating the costs to be based on the evidence, allowing the judge to divide the private road into sections as necessary under the circumstances.

While section 228.369 is intended to address a very real problem, it puts judges in a position of creating permanent, substantial financial relationships, which is much different from judges determining the extent of liability based on existing contracts or other relationships. Some judges will be comfortable with this expanded role, and others will wonder why the legislature would grant them a power that is in many cases beyond their expertise.

 

 

 

Leave a comment

Posted in county government, Missouri law, Ozarks economy, real estate development, real estate law and tagged . Bookmark the permalink.

Breaking bad; closing good. So is walking away.

Posted on August 16, 2016 by Harry Styron

The rebound of the real estate market in the Ozarks seems very real, judging from the calls I get from stressed out buyers and sellers who are approaching closing dates.

Buyers sometimes want break contracts, and sellers want to force the buyers to close.

If the buyer has not made objections to the condition of the property in the proper time, or if the reason for wanting out seem weak (by “weak” I mean petty or based on alleged fraudulent concealment that shouldn’t have fooled an inspector), I tell them to either close or buy their way out with money. It is difficult for a buyer to prove that a seller has breached a contract, and spending two or three years in a lawsuit  is a very expensive way to not have fun.

If a seller calls me because a buyer is threatening to walk away from the contract, I tell the seller that a suit for specific performance (asking the judge to force the buyer to close) is unlikely to be successful and would result in the property being taken off the market while the suit is pending.

The seller’s other alternative is to sell the house to someone else, then sue the buyer for damages, which are the difference between the contract price in the first contract and the price at which the property actually sells. In a rising market, there’s a good chance of finding another buyer and perhaps getting a better price, so litigation is unnecessary.

When I get these calls, here’s what I’m really thinking. I might have been able to prevent this situation if I had been asked to assist in the preparation of the contract. I would get to meet the client when the client was happy, rather than angry.

I could have looked at the title history to the property. I could have given advice based on my long experience in this market and knowledge about such things as:

  • subdivision covenants,
  • the developer of the subdivision,
  • the builder’s reputation,
  • how well the HOA is functioning,
  • drainage and road maintenance,
  • past or pending litigation involving the property or the subdivision

Instead, I speak to people who are already upset, who seem to resent that I don’t see the other party as a villain, and who have to make a decision in the next 24 hours.

It’s a joke among lawyers that a friend or client will call a lawyer to complain about a $200 traffic ticket, but will not talk to the lawyer about a $300,000 real estate contract. So when I get the call, I have to work really hard to be sympathetic.

3 Comments

Posted in Branson, homeowner association, Missouri, real estate development, real estate law and tagged . Bookmark the permalink.

Owner of philandering bull strictly liable but comparatively at fault for neighbor’s injuries

Posted on February 3, 2016 by Harry Styron

When Taylor’s bull crossed the fence, attracted by Coble’s heifers, Coble hopped on his ATV. The bull charged and the ATV flipped. The bull mounted–not the heifer–but the ATV, pinning Coble, who was seriously injured. In Coble v. Taylor, the Missouri of Appeals for the Southern District reviewed Missouri’s fencing laws to affirm that Taylor was liable for Coble’s injuries resulting from his attempt to drive the bull back home. The jury awarded damages for Coble’s injuries; however, the damage award was reduced, based on the jury finding that Taylor was 65% at fault and Coble was 35% at fault.

Under Missouri’s fencing laws, particularly section 272.030, an owner of livestock is liable for damages sustained if his animal trespasses by breaching a lawful fence.

Taylor (the owner of the bull) argued that the fence was not an “exterior” fence (one along a public road, not a fence that separates the land of two different owners), but a partition fence, and therefore was not the kind of fence that section 272.030 referred to. The appellate court stated that section 272.030 was a modern statute that didn’t follow the old common law that limited the livestock owner’s liability to injuries resulting only breaches of exterior fences, which was related to the 19th century concept of fencing out free-ranging animals, rather than fencing them in.

Taylor also argued that the he and his wife should not be strictly liable for injuries resulting from animal trespass, so that they should not be liable for injuries caused by Coble flipping his ATV. “Strict liability” essentially means liability without regard to the actions of the person who was injured. The appeals court reviewed the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 518, which is a distillation of appellate court decisions of state and federal courts, with commentary, to find that “any trespassing bull may be expected to attack and gore any other animal or any person who gets in his way.” Thus it is reasonable to expect that people will try to control the bull and get hurt doing so, and the owner of the bull should be liable.

Coble argued that the jury should not have been instructed to determine that he was partly at fault for the way he drove the ATV, which led the jury to only compensate him for only 65% of the damages that he proved. The appeals court said that the jury was properly instructed to apply Missouri’s comparative fault statute, because the Missouri Supreme Court has determined that the legislature intended for comparative fault to be applied whenever possible (other than cases of intentional injury), even though the idea of strict liability and comparative fault seem incompatible.

Leave a comment

Posted in agriculture, Missouri, Missouri economy, Missouri law, Ozarks, real estate law and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Indemnity clause in commercial lease does not allow recovery of attorney fees by tenant

Posted on October 19, 2015 by Harry Styron

A person who is fired up about filing a lawsuit believes he will win and will recover his attorney fees. Lawyers in Missouri and most of the United States have to throw cold water on the prospective client, because attorney fees are not generally recoverable unless provided for by a statute or a contract between the warring parties. This is called the American Rule, apparently because the general rule is different in other countries, where the rule is “loser pays.”

I was surprised to read today an imaginative litigant had been able to convince a trial judge that an indemnity clause in a lease of commercial property would support an attorney fee award. The case is Morris Branson Theatre v. Cindy Lee LLC.

The appeals court reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of a tenant, finding that the landlord had failed to adequately repair the leased premises from tornado damage. The trial court also ordered the landlord to pay the tenant’s legal fees, on the basis of a clause in the lease that required each party “pay, protect, indemnify and save harmless” each other from liabilities arising out of the other party’s violation of the lease. This language is typical for an indemnity clause.

The appeals court sent the case back to the trial court for additional findings of fact, based on the appeals court having determined that the definition for “premises” applied by the trial court was too broad.

Because the trial court’s judgment in favor of the tenant was set aside by the appellate court, the attorney fee award was also reversed as being moot. Anticipating that the same issue would arise again when the trial court addressed the case again (unless the parties choose to settle), the court of appeals advised the landlord and tenant and trial judge that the indemnity clause is only to be applied when landlord or tenant is required to defend a claim made by another party. The indemnity clause does not apply to litigation between the landlord and tenant.

Even though people in the Ozarks sometimes think they are quite exceptional, the court of appeals let this landlord and tenant and a trial judge know that the American Rule still applies.

Leave a comment

Posted in Missouri law, real estate law and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Missouri Court of Appeals upholds architectural committee’s ban on outbuildings

Posted on February 5, 2015 by Harry Styron

Stanley Sellers bought a home in Woodfield subdivision and wanted to build an outdoor kitchen. He applied to the Woodfield property owners’ association’s architectural committee, which approved his plans. Without asking for approval, he then built a storage building in his yard. The POA told him that the architectural committee had adopted a rule that prohibited storage and utility buildings. Sellers asked the POA and the architectural committee to change its rules or grant him a waiver, which did not happen.

(For clarification, the document that is referred to here as “covenants” is also referred to as a “declaration” or “subdivision restrictions” or “covenants, conditions and restrictions” or “master deed” or “subdivision indenture,” depending on where you are. An association of lot owners is called a property owners’ association (POA) or homeowners’ association (HOA). “Architecture committees” are sometimes called “architectural control committees (ACCs) or design review committees (DRCs), or some other variation.)

Sellers sued, arguing that the rule against storage buildings  was invalid, because Missouri law prohibits adoption of additional subdivision covenants (“new burdens”) without unanimous approval of all lot owners, unless the covenants permit addition of new burdens on real estate by less than unanimous consent. The trial court ruled for the POA, indicating that the covenants in place before Sellers’ purchase of a lot empowered the POA to regulate “accessory structures” and allowed the architecture committee to make “guidelines and policies for the development and [sic] a residential community which is harmonious and aesthetically pleasing.” Thus the prohibition of storage buildings was a burden within the scope of the recorded covenants rather than the imposition of a new burden.

The appeals court’s decision in Sellers v. Woodfield POA, upholding the trial court’s decision, makes a few points worth remembering:

  • A court reviewing the decision of an architectural committee reviews only for reasonableness and does not substitute its opinion (for the architectural committee’s opinion) as to harmony or disharmony.
  • It doesn’t matter whether the homeowner was aware of the requirements. Though the court of appeals didn’t explain this, a purchaser of a lot is deemed as a matter of law to have knowledge of subdivision covenants applicable to the lot, if the covenants are recorded.
  • If the covenants authorize the POA or the architecture committee to make additional rules not in the recorded covenants, the lot purchaser also is deemed to have notice of this rulemaking authority and should ask about the existence of additional rules.

3 Comments

Posted in real estate development, real estate law and tagged , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Missouri appeals court reverses trial court, slaps down bank that manipulated HOA

Posted on November 11, 2014 by Harry Styron

The Missouri Supreme Court, on June 30, 2015, reversed much of this Court of Appeals decision discussed in this post, reinstating the judgment of the trial court, after determining that Jefferson Bank’s amendment of the covenants was proper. The amendment removed the requirement that the HOA’s board members be residents; the Supreme Court reasoned that unanimous consent of the lot owners was not required since the nature of the amendment was to remove rather than add a restriction.

After the real estate bubble burst, many Missouri banks ended up owning a majority of lots in subdivisions, standing in the shoes of the developers–the banks’ previous customers. Banks face many challenges in their effort to sell the lots that they had to take through foreclosure; not the least is high-end architectural standards imposed by the original developer that seem unworkable in this more austere era.

Jefferson Bank & Trust found itself in this fix after it became the owner of 13 of the 18 lots in the Arbors at Sugar Creek subdivision. In 2005, the developer had recorded covenants that gave the board of the homeowners’ association (HOA) approval rights over any new construction. The owners of the five existing homes  protested when the bank and its new partner proposed to build what the homeowners characterized as “tract houses.”

Because the original HOA had been dissolved by the Missouri Secretary of State for failing to file annual reports, the bank formed a new HOA and recorded a new declaration of covenants, since it had more than 67% of the voting power, as required by the old declaration for amendment. The new declaration eliminated the old declaration’s requirement that HOA board members be residents, and the bank appointed its executives to be the new board.

After a bunch of wrangling in court, the trial court ruled that the new HOA was legitimate, that the new board acted reasonably in approving the new building plans, asking that the HOA reimburse the bank for subdivision maintenance costs paid by the bank, and awarding other damages against the lot owners.

The appeals court in this October 28, 2014 decision, agreed that the new HOA was the successor to the old HOA, but threw out the rest of the trial court’s judgment, to find that the bank acted in bad faith, having

  • relied on its acquisition of majority voting power to unilaterally deny homeowners the benefit of self-governance that they received under the original declaration
  • used its command of the subdivision’s affairs to advance in own financial interest in redeveloping the subdivision in a manner contrary to the wishes of the newly disenfranchised residents
  • violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by amending the declaration and removing the residency requirement for board members so it could appoint its own executives to the board.

Having stacked the board of the new HOA, the appeals court ruled “all the board’s subsequent actions are null and void,” including the approval of development plans submitted by the bank’s partner.

The critical factor here is the requirement of the original declaration that the HOA board members be residents. The overreaching on this issue tainted everything else that the bank did.

It’s unusual to see a court roll over a bank in favor of homeowners. My guess is that the Missouri Supreme Court will be asked to review this decision.

1 Comment

Posted in homeowner association, Missouri, Missouri economy, Missouri law, real estate development, real estate law and tagged , . Bookmark the permalink.

Quitclaim deed to living trust can terminate title insurance coverage and trigger legal malpractice claim

Posted on November 4, 2014 by Harry Styron

When my clients discovered that a neighbor’s deed included a strip of land across their driveway, I advised them to make a claim on their title insurance policy. The claim was denied, not because it wasn’t real, but because my clients had inadvertently terminated their policy of title insurance by conveying their land to their living trust by quitclaim deed rather than by warranty deed.

Title insurance in the United States is usually issued on policy forms created by the American Land Title Association (ALTA), which are adapted for each state. Before the adoption of the 2006 ALTA title insurance form, when the insured conveys all its interest in the real estate without warranty, the owner’s policy of title insurance terminates.

The primary way of conveying title insurance without warranty is by quitclaim deed, which is a common way of conveying property when payment is not made. How this custom developed, I don’t know, but it can be devastating if there is an ownership dispute.

The 2006 ALTA owner’s policy form includes living trusts as insureds under the title insurance policy, but most owner’s policies of title insurance are made on pre-2006 forms.

A lawyer setting up a living trust–or preparing a conveyance of a gift of real estate to a relative, a church or another charity–has two choices to avoid potential malpractice liability:

  • review the existing owner’s policy of title insurance to make sure that the conveyance won’t leave the the client unprotected if an ownership dispute pops up.
  • avoid using quitclaim deeds except with respect to property that the client never owned and other very limited circumstances.

 

5 Comments

Posted in Missouri, real estate law and tagged , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Getting a Missouri collector’s deed after a tax sale just became harder

Posted on July 5, 2012 by Harry Styron

On July 3, 2012, the Missouri Supreme Court released two opinions that clarify the procedure by which purchasers of tax certificates at the annual August sales may obtain deeds to the tax-delinquent property. Both cases illuminate section 140.405 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri with respect to the content and timing of notices (“redemption notices”) required to be sent to the delinquent taxpayer (and others, such as lienholders) so that the tax sale purchaser can obtain a deed to the property for which the purchaser has paid the delinquent taxes and received a “certificate of purchase” which I refer to here as a tax certificate. These new decisions apply to first-year sales and second-year sales, not third-year sales, which have different redemption rules.

Redemption notices must be sent at least 90 days before August anniversary of sale

Harpagon MO, LLC v. Bosch overrules Read the rest of this entry →

27 Comments

Posted in Missouri economy, Missouri law, property tax, real estate law and tagged , , , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

“Plus interest” is implied by court from contract for deed to defeat buyer’s claim

Posted on April 26, 2012 by Harry Styron

The contract for deed stated that the purchase price was $30,000, to be paid with $3,000 down and 144 monthly payments of $300. The buyers made 90 payments of $300, for a total of $27,000, and demanded a deed.

While the amount financed was stated to be $27,000, the product of 144 monthly payments of $300 would be $43,200.   On the seller’s motion for summary judgment, the trial judge held that the buyers were not entitled to the deed, because the contract required payment of 144 installments of $300, not 90 installments.

The Southern District Court of Appeals agreed  with the trial judge in Webbe v. Keel, stating:

It is not ambiguous for 144 monthly payments to exceed this contract’s sale price because the time value of money is a judicially-known concept.

Even though the contract did not specifically mention interest on the $27,000, the court apparently saw the buyer’s agreement to pay $16,200 in excess of the $27,000 balance over 12 years to be an agreement to pay interest.

Because the case involved contract interpretation, it could be ruled on by a judge without a trial on a motion for summary judgment, unless the trial judge found that the contract was ambiguous. If the trial judge found the contract to be ambiguous, a trial would be held to obtain evidence outside the text of the contract.

Many agreements to pay money over time that are prepared by amateurs fail to mention the interest rate, how interest is calculated (360-day year or 365-day year, compounding period), early payoff provisions and how payments are to be applied  (on day received or on first day of month if received by 5th, for example).

Webbe v. Keel shows how even a very simple contract can pull the parties into court.

 

Leave a comment

Posted in Missouri, Missouri law, real estate law and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Cassville Aldermen take on Cassville Board of Adjustment to challenge carport variance

Posted on March 22, 2012 by Harry Styron

It might seem odd to you that the Cassville board of aldermen would appeal a decision of the Cassville board of adjustment, since the board of aldermen appoints the members of the board of adjustment, and both boards are a part of the same city government. It seems odd to me that the point was not raised by the respondent on appeal.

Under Missouri statutes, boards of adjustments have some independence, and the appeal of the board of adjustment’s decision to grant a variance is the novel method that the Cassville board of aldermen chose to maintain the uniform application of their zoning regulations.

In Board of Aldermen of Cassville v. Board of Adjustment and Gerald Shaffer, nobody raised the question of whether the Board of Aldermen had the right to attempt to control the board of adjustment by appeal to circuit court. The Southern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the board of adjustment, with the effect of requiring Shaffer to remove the portion of his carport that extend over the setback line.

What are these boards?

A board of aldermen, under Missouri’s statutes for fourth-class cities, is the governing body of the city. It is the city’s legislative body, by adopting ordinances, and also the city’s executive branch, by giving orders to the mayor and city administrator. The mayor doesn’t even vote, except to break a tie.

The board of adjustment is authorized by Missouri’s planning and zoning statutes for cities, (Missouri counties have separate planning and zoning statutes) specifically sections 89. 080 through 89.110. Section 89.090 gives boards of adjustments three kinds of power:

  1. to hear and decide appeals of errors made by the planning and zoning staff,
  2. to hear and decide other appeals, as required by city ordinances, and
  3. to hear and decide applications for variances from the city’s codes relating to construction and alteration of buildings and the use of land.

The board of adjustment has the power to reverse, affirm or modify decisions of the planning and zoning board and its staff.

Under section 89,110, persons aggrieved by the decision of the board of adjustment may appeal the board’s decision to the circuit court of the county. Rather than hear evidence, the circuit court reviews the record of the proceedings of the board of adjustment, as though the circuit court were an appellate court.

Why did the Cassville board of aldermen take this matter so seriously?

Was the Cassville board of aldermen aggrieved by the decision of the board of adjustment to allow  Mr. Shaffer to have a carport that extended closer to his property line than the five feet allowed by Cassville zoning regulations?

In most challenges to the right of a party to appeal a board of adjustment’s decision, Missouri courts have been reluctant to give that right to just anyone who claims to be aggrieved. In other cases, neighbors who did not protest the decision at the board of adjustment hearing have been denied the right to appeal, as has a St. Louis alderwoman.

Regardless of the issue of whether the Cassville board of aldermen had the right to appeal the decision, the aldermen apparently wanted to hold the board of adjustment to compliance with the standards of the Cassville ordinances pertaining to variances.

Variances for structures and uses

Variances from strict application of zoning codes are allowed when the board of adjustment (or another board having such powers) has determined that the criteria for granting variances have been met. Cassville’s ordinances required that all five criteria contained in the ordinance be met, all highly subjective except that the hardship alleged to exist must not have been created by the owner or applicant and that the condition for which the variance is required must be unique to the property.

The Court of Appeals judges agreed with the Cassville aldermen’s contention that nothing about the Shaffer property was unique and that the alleged hardship–which was that visitors might have to walk to his door in the rain–was trivial.

 

Leave a comment

Posted in Ozarks economy, real estate development, real estate law, zoning and tagged , . Bookmark the permalink.
← Older Posts
→