Category Archives: Missouri

Pondering intentional flooding: why are we in this mess?

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The random aspect of tornado damage is one thing. But people have put themselves in the paths of floodwaters. Now the Missouri River’s flood is moving downstream. Who knows what it will do to the Mississippi?

But can you blame people for building homes and businesses in the floodplains? We spent billions to control our rivers and create an economy that depends on our controlling them.

Have we lost the ability to manage our environment, or we were just kidding ourselves that our engineering ability (incorporating politically-mandated compromises) would be effective?

I ponder these things in a longish essay: Unnatural disasters: flooding from managed rivers and what to do. Of course, I don’t know what to do. Maybe you have an idea.

Please read and comment.

Can a city’s utility charges be a tax? It’s a tough case to prove.

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The City of Hermann provides water, sewer, natural gas, electricity and trash pickup to its residents, allowing them no choice of providers. When the City jacked up the rates and transferred the “profits” to other City accounts, some residents resented the City’s flexing of its monopoly power. They sued, claiming that the City’s governing board had sidestepped Missouri’s constitutional requirement (Article X, sections 16- 24, known as the Hancock Amendment) that tax increases be approved by voters. The court had to decide whether a utility rate increase was a disguised tax.

Here’s an overview of the Missouri Supreme Court’s 26-page opinion in Arbor Investtment Company LLC v. City of Hermann, released May 31, 2011, in which the court determined that the  City of Hermann’s utility fees were not taxes.

The Five (or Six or Seven) Factors

The Missouri Supreme Court identified five factors in the 1991 case Keller v. Marion County Ambulance District which may be applied to distinguish user fees (not requiring a vote of the people) from a tax (which requires a vote). These factors, the court pointed out, are not exhaustive, but provide a framework for analysis:

  1. When is the fee paid?
  2. Who pays the fee?
  3. Is the amount of the fee affected by the level of the service that it is for?
  4. Is the fee for a good or a service?
  5. Is the good or service one that has been historically provided by the government?

The City of Hermann’s utility charges are paid in response to monthly billing, after the services have been metered. This resembles a user charge, rather than a tax that is paid annually. Of course, it also resembles a sales tax that is paid upon a sale.

The City’s utility charges are assessed only against utility customers, unlike some kinds of taxes, which are charged without reference to who is using government services. For example, sales taxes are charged to non-resident and residents alike.

The amount of the City’s utility charges, at least above minimums and flat charges, is related directly to use, other than for Hermann’s “communications fee,” which is used to support the 911 network.

The City’s utility charges fees are imposed for goods or services, rather than being a general tax to be used however the City government chooses. This factor was not at issue in this challenge, though the plaintiffs claimed that the amount of the fees were in excess of the reasonable capital and operating costs incurred in providing the services.

The Supreme Court found the fifth factor in favor of a finding of a tax, though the City of Hermann has a long history of providing these services in Hermann. The court indicated that the City’s prohibition of any other provider offering these goods and services supports a finding that the utility charges are a tax, without explaining why, other than to state that the lack of alternatives was a part (a sixth factor?) of the analysis. Even so, a finding that the utility charges resembled a tax on this point was not enough to overcome the opposite findings on the other factors.

Borrowing from its opinion in Beatty v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, the court looked at a sixth factor, whether the payment was enforceable by imposition of a lien on the user’s property or merely by disconnection or discontinuance of the service. Without taking judicial notice of the fact that many if not most private and municipal utilities have the right to impose liens for non-payment of utility charges–in addition to disconnection– the court considered that a tax, such as a property tax, is secured by a lien, while utility providers have the right to disconnect the services to enforce payment.

The court upheld the City of Hermann’s utility rates, stating, “There simply has been no showing that the amount charged is so excessive as to not constitute the provision of a service or good in return for the amount paid.”

Municipal rates are unregulated, but does this lead to excessive rate levels?

We should be concerned with the quality of the facilities for providing our water supply, treatment and management of wastewater and stormwater, and delivery of electricity and telecommunications services. The infrastructure for these essential things was constructed in the 19th and 20th centuries. Repairing, replacing and upgrading them is enormously expensive and in many cases has been deferred.

But private and governmental providers face stiff resistance in raising revenues to confront these challenges. For many private providers, utility commissions determine the extent to which rate increases are allowed. For other providers, such as cooperatives, homeowner associations and local governments, rate increases are within the discretion of elected officials, who have wide discretion and motivations that may extend beyond the provision of utility services.

In my experience, local governments, looking at water and sewer rates, generally look around to neighboring communities and communities of the same size elsewhere in the state, hoping to stay somewhere below the top. While this strategy may be effective for helping elected officials to remain in office, it may not produce sufficient revenue for maintaining utility systems.

 

Recording a real estate document gives notice, but lack of recording doesn’t?


By Missouri statute, the recording a document relating to real estate in the office of the county recorder of deeds gives notice to all of the contents of the recorded document (called an “instrument”):

Every such instrument in writing, certified and recorded in the manner herein prescribed, shall, from time of filing the same with the recorder for record, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof and all subsequent purchasers and mortgagees shall be deemed, in law and equity, to purchase with notice.

Is lack of recording notice that something did not occur, even though it should have been recorded?

According to the Missouri Court of Appeals, in the case Warren County Concrete v. Peoples Bank & Trust and Warren County Title Company,  purchaser of real estate had no duty to check to see whether a release of a deed of trust had been recorded, even though the purchaser had provided the money to pay off the deed of trust to a title company that closed the transaction.

The purchaser claimed to have no idea that the bank had not released the deed of trust until four years later, when the purchaser received a notice that the bank was foreclosing on the property. A year later — more than five years after the purchaser closed its purchase of the property — the purchaser filed a lawsuit against the bank and the title company, alleging that they were obligated to record the release.

The bank and title company claimed that the five-year statute of limitations period had run for negligence and breach of contract, and the purchaser was out of luck. The trial court agreed.

The purchaser appealed, claiming that the statute of limitations only began to run when the purchaser became aware that he had been wronged, which would have been the date the notice of foreclosure was delivered to the purchaser.

In the appeal, the bank and the title company argued that the purchaser should have checked the recorder’s office after the closing to make sure that the release had been recorded. The appeals court reversed the trial court’s judgment, stating that the burden of searching the public records after the closing was “a duty we are unwilling to place on the purchaser.”

The Court of Appeals was probably influenced by the injustice that would result when a purchaser hires a title company to close a transaction and provides money to pay off an existing loan, but the title company fails to follow up to make sure that the lender receives the payoff and records a proper release.

The Court of Appeals’ opinion isn’t specific about the reason for the mix-up, but it looks like the bank recorded a release after receiving the payoff, but that the release described a different piece of real estate than the piece that purchaser bought.

Contract protects self-storage company from liability for roof leak


Surely, a self-storage company would be responsible for damage to stored goods if the storage company neglected its roof, allowing water leaks.

John Easley, who represented himself, found out that the not-so-fine print left him with damaged goods, a worthless insurance policy and a big disappointment.

When Easley placed his furniture in AAA Mini Storage, he signed the usual forms that state that the warehouse owner is not responsible for damages and that the tenant is responsible for insuring the stored goods against damage.

Two years later, Easley found that rain had leaked into the storage unit and puddled against the back wall of the unit, leaving his goods damaged by moisture and mold. He made a claim on his insurance policy. The insurance adjuster said that negligent maintenance of the roof caused Easley’s loss, which was an exclusion from coverage.

Easley sued AAA Mini Storage in small claims court in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and lost. He then took advantage of the Missouri law that allows losers in small claims court to have a new trial in associate circuit court.

This time Easley won. The judge agreed that the release of liability that Easley signed did not excuse AAA Mini Storage’s implicit obligation to maintain its roof. AAA Mini Storage appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals.

Easley didn’t file a legal brief in the appeal, which may have been a mistake. The appellate opinion, Easley v. Gray Wolf Investments, agreed with the storage company’s legal argument:

Missouri law recognizes that a contract may eliminate liability for future negligence if the release is clear, unambiguous, unmistakable, and in conspicuous language.

The appellate judges reviewed the release of liability and found it was clearly and simply written and that its language was conspicuous, since some of it was in all capital letters.

The appellate judges also found that Easley was “a relatively sophisticated party,” because “he was building a 2,613-square-foot home with a walk-out basement.” Is this wisdom or what? Wow, a walk-out basement!

Not all releases of future liability are enforceable. Lawyers, for example, are prohibited by the Code of Professional Conduct from entering into contracts that release them from liability for their future negligence.

According to the Court of Appeals, Missourians need to make sure that their self-storage contracts include a clause requiring the storage company to repair leaks in their roofs. If the storage company won’t agree to change its form just for you, you can haul your stuff to a different place, perhaps Illinois.

Ozark houses: White River Valley stonework

Ozark houses: White River Valley stonework

Looking over Bull Creek, about 30 miles south of Springfield, this old house displays one of several types of stonework that appears in the houses built in the White River Valley around 100 years ago. The smooth, flat stones come from the rivers and creeks. Some people call it river rock.

 

In this view, you can see that the pattern of laying the small flat stones horizontally is occasionally broken by standing a larger stone on end. Above the cellar door (and windows and doorways not visible here), small stones are set vertically akin to what brickmasons would call a “soldier course,” sometimes arching a bit.

I visited this house with a couple of sisters whose uncle had owned it in the early 1960s. The uncle added the fireplace.

You can see several  fine examples of this type of stonework on Downing Street in Hollister, Missouri, and in a few of the older commercial buildings in downtown Branson.

 

Missouri hog farm flunks smell test, must pay $11 million to neighbors


I’ve heard that the vows of many vegetarians have been temporarily broken by the craving induced by the smell of bacon being cooked over a campfire.

But the process of creating bacon, ham and pork chops can create such awful odors that a Missouri jury awarded $11 million to those who could not escape the smell of hog farm effluent applied to neighboring fields.

Premium Standard Farms operates several hog farms in northern Missouri, where sparse population and proximity to feed grains hold costs down. These confinement feeding operations (CAFOs) produce lots of pork and staggering amounts of pungent effluent (urine and feces). PSF disposes of the effluent by tilling the fields around its hog houses and spraying the effluent into the air over the loosened soil. While the effluent is being sprayed (as much as 300 feet into the air) and as it soaks into the soil, it releases foul odors.

In one of many suits against PSF, sixty-one neighboring property owners sued PSF and its affilliates in 2002  for damages resulting from the bad smells wafting from PSF’s effluent application over an 11-year period ending in 2010. After much pretrial wrangling, with the plaintiffs being split up into groups based on distance from the hog farm, a four-week trial was held in Kansas City, and fifteen plaintiffs were awarded just over $11 million in compensatory damages.

The claims were made under the legal theory of temporary nuisance, which allows damages to be awarded if the plaintiffs can prove that the use of the defendant’s property was detrimental to the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs’ properties. Plaintiffs are not required to prove that their property values were permanently diminished by the nuisance, only that their use and enjoyment of their properties were harmed during the time of the nuisance.

PSF appealed the jury verdict, claiming six different errors, a couple of which are interesting. The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected all six. PSF’s most interesting arguments are:

  • owners of unoccupied farmland are not entitled to recover in a temporary nuisance suit because of their business use of their property.
  • the only measure of damages for loss of use of business property is the loss of  property value during the period of the nuisance, rather than whatever a jury thinks would compensate the owner for unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the owner’s property.

The law of nuisance grew out of the common law. For nearly 150 years, law students have been told about Rylands v. Fletcher, an 1868 decision of an English court that changed the law of nuisance by establishing strict liability of those who produce or harbor dangerous or noxious substances on their land. Those who have the bad stuff on their land can be liable to their neighbors if the bad stuff escapes, regardless of whether the escape of the bad stuff happened as a result of negligence.

State legislatures don’t like to adopt regulations that create liability for those who create lots of jobs and tax revenues, so it remains the job of judges and juries to fashion remedies for dealing with some kinds of pollution. The Court of Appeals rejected PSF’s analysis of case law, concluding

there is no persuasive reason that land used for business purposes could not support an award for the loss of the use and enjoyment of such property by the business owner…We refuse to say as a matter of law that the owners of farmland are not entitled to the reasonable use and enjoyment of that land merely because business activities are conducted on it.

CAFOs provide markets for feed grains raised by neighboring farmers. That’s why many CAFOs are located in areas of fertile soil and ample water. Neighbors to a CAFO are likely to be substantial farmers, some of whom produce grains that feed the CAFO’s poultry, cattle or hogs. Many of their farms are large and highly mechanized and often owned by farming corporations or limited liability companies. CAFOs support local economies, generating tax revenues, income and jobs, keeping alive communities that would otherwise continue to wither.

CAFOs also consume huge amounts of water that becomes effluent, the smell of which can make it impossible to be outside during and shortly after it is applied to fields. Under Missouri law, users of private wells pay nothing for the withdrawn water, even though the withdrawals deplete shared acquifers. In other words, CAFO operators, like other businesses, don’t want to bear all the costs of their activities, hoping that these costs can be spread over the larger community. The judicial system, applying the common law, still allows juries to force polluters to bear more of their social costs than the polluters would voluntarily accept.

A couple of big firms start blogging about Missouri law


Most lawyers practice in small firms, which may be why most lawyers who write blogs are in solo or small-firm practices. Marketing consultants to the legal industry have been pushing blogging for several years, and now more attorneys from large firms are getting into the act. I’ve added three blogs written by large-firm lawyers to Read the rest of this entry

Glaize Creek Sewer District blows condemnation case, but gets new chance


At a condemnation trial, Glaize Creek Sewer District (in Jefferson County, Missouri, just south of St. Louis), didn’t put on any admissible evidence of damages to the Gorhams’ property. The Gorhams put on proper evidence of damages, showing that the value of their property after the sewer line was installed declined by $29,000. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict of zero damages (based on an appraiser‘s unsubstantiated opinion testimony), and sent the case back for a new trial.

Two things are unusual about this case: Read the rest of this entry

“Taxpayer” loses property to city of St. Louis


Four justices of the  Missouri Supreme Court wouldn’t help Bhatti recover his property, which had been sold by the City of St. Louis in an effort to collect Bhatti’s delinquent property taxes. These justices reckoned that Bhatti was obligated to know whether letters that he never received were reasonably calculated to reach him and inform him that he was losing his property.

The court’s majority opinion pointed out crucial facts that kept the court from applying the due process rules which were set out by the United States Supreme Court in a series of decisions, most recently in Jones v. Flowers, a 2006 decision.

At trial, Bhatti failed to provide evidence to indicate that the sheriff had reason to know that the mailed notices were not reaching Bhatti.

In a motion for a new trial  based on newly discovered evidence,  Bhatti provided the envelopes marked “return to sender” which the sheriff’s office had received. Bhatti’s motion for a new trial was rejected, because Bhatti did not show the court that the returned envelopes were not available at the time of the first trial.

Bhatti also argued that the evidence of the returned notices to him were a part of the fat file that was included in the trial exhibits. The Missouri Supreme Court stated that the trial court was under no obligation to sort through a fat file to find documents that would help Bhatti — it was up to Bhatti (or his attorney) to call the trial judge’s attention to specific documents that would support Bhatti’s case.

In its conclusion, the Missouri Supreme Court lectured Bhatti on three points, only one of which is based on law (which I have put into separate paragraphs):

The Court regrets the result in this case. But Owner’s loss of his real estate is the result of his multiple acts of negligence.

  • First, he was negligent in failing to pay his real estate taxes for three years…
  • Second, Owner provided an incorrect address for the purpose of notification of real estate taxes due, and he never updated his address….
  • Third, when pursuing his constitutional rights in our court system, he failed to follow United Supreme Court authority that requires him to show that the notice sent to him was not reasonably calculated to apprise him of the pendency of the action against him.

The lessons from this lecture are clear:

  • If you own property and are not receiving a tax bill for it, you need to contact the tax collector.
  • The Missouri Supreme Court expects a person to know whether or not a notice not received is “reasonably calculated to apprise him of the pendency of the action.”

Negligence of the property owner is not a part of the constitutional law in due process cases. The court’s remarks about Bhatti’s negligence are gratuitous, but perhap provide a moral underpinning to the dissent’s position that focused on the City’s lack of effort in getting notices to Bhatti.

Justice Wolff’s dissent, supported by justices Stith and Teitelman, notes that the government spent a total of $1.28 in postage to send notices to Bhatti, even though the government is obligated to send notices that are “reasonably calculated to apprise him of the judgment of foreclosure, the forclosure sale and the confirmation hearing.” The government knew that Bhatti didn’t receive the notices, but still sold Bhatti’s property to collect $7,600 in taxes.

The City of St. Louis had another address for Bhatti, which Bhatti used on his building permit applications. Wolff indicated that the City should have also sent a notice to this alternate address, rather than only to the vacant building which Bhatti was fixing up.

Wolff also argues that the City’s tax lien foreclosure ordinances, as implemented, do not provide due process.The City, having the returned mail sent to Bhatti, should not benefit from the presumption that mail has been received.

Sargent Shriver: what a nice guy


News of the illness and death of Sargent Shriver made me think about the hour I spent with him on September 8, 1972.

I was a student at the University of Missouri, and through a set of circumstances that I don’t recall I found myself manning a PA system on the steps of the Hillel Foundation building adjacent to the campus for a campaign appearance of  Missouri’s junior Senator Thomas Eagleton and Sargent Shriver.

A few days earlier, George McGovern‘s presidential campaign had named Shriver as his running mate, in place of Eagleton, in reaction to undeniable allegations Read the rest of this entry