Category Archives: Ozarks

Never mind, Missouri cities can charge different tap fees in different parts of town


Earlier this year, I wrote that the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals, in  City of Sullivan v. Sites,  had struck down an ordinance of the City of Sullivan that established a higher tap fee for connecting to the city’s sewer main in a particular part of town. The voters of the City of Sullivan had approved a $3.3 million bond issue to extend sewers to a part of  the city without sewer service. The city’s board  of aldermen adopted an ordinance imposing a connection fee in the newly-served area that was higher than the connection fee charged in the remainder of the city.

The Sites trust challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance establishing the higher connection fee, claiming that the ordinance violated Article III, section 40(30), which prohibited the passage of local or special laws where a general law would suffice. A general law relates to persons or things as a class, while a special or local law relates to particular persons or places.

However, Missouri Supreme Court’s opinion in City of Sullivan v. Sites, reversed the Court of Appeals decision and affirmed the trial court’s decision upholding the ordinance. The Supreme Court reviewed court decisions that recognize that prohibitions against special or local laws “should not prevent necessary geographic classifications premised on legitimate distinguish characteristics.” The Supreme Court determined that the Site trust’s property was not singled out, but was a part of a geographic area n area that was defined as a class.

The Supreme Court held that “the city was justified in creating the class of new sewer connections charged higher connection fees,” having demonstrated good financial and practical reasons for requiring property in the newly-served area, noting that the imposition of higher fees in the new area “contributed to the City’s ability to fund the sewer project as a whole.”

Pen-raised whitetail deer are domestic animals, under Missouri law


If a court told me that I had to kill my dog for killing a deer, I’d be upset. But it could happen.

When a dog kills or maims a “domestic animal” in Missouri,  the statutory penalties (section 273.020 RSMo) are harsh. The owner or keeper of the bad dog is liable for the full amount of monetary damages and is obligated to kill the bad dog. But can whitetail deer be considered domestic animals?

Three dogs, alleged to have been owned by Lange, broke into Oak Creek’s pen and killed 21 bucks, does and fawns, all hand-raised and kept for the ultimate purpose of creating bucks with massive racks. When Oak Creek sued Lange, Lange asked the court to rule, in a motion for summary judgment, that the words “sheep and other domestic animals” in section 273.020 applied to livestock typically raised on farms, such as cattle, swine, chickens and horses.

The Missouri court of appeals in Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch v. Lange disagreed with the Osage County trial judge, looking to a dictionary definition, which included the phrase “which have been domesticated by man so as to live and breed in a tame condition.” The court of appeals noted that the slain deer had never been in the wild, but “were all penned and hand-fed, raised in an environment that did not allow them to move freely beyond their confined area.”  The court’s logic is apparently that whether an animal (other than a sheep) is domestic is determined by the individual animal’s status, not the species. Oak Creek’s deer were apparently defenseless in their confinement, unable to flee and perhaps unable to survive in the wild. Cats, dogs and hogs often become feral, regardless of their previous condition of confinement.

The offspring of breeding stock, such as those killed in Oak Creek’s pen, are apparently not domestic animals when placed on game ranches to be killed by trophy-seeking hunters, who pay handsomely for the privilege of slaughtering them. You can see an example of the ideal rack on the Farming for Wildlife website.

Judge corrected for merging both Carroll County judicial districts



Eureka Springs and Berryville, both towns in Carroll County, Arkansas, are just eight miles apart, separated by the valley of the Kings River. The Arkansas legislature in 1883 created a judicial district for the county west of the Kings River and the another judicial district on the east side of the river.

But in 2010, for reasons not explained in the Arkansas Supreme Court’s opinion, Parker v. Crow, Eastern District Judge Gerald Crow ruled that henceforth there would be only one judicial district in Carroll County.

Eureka Springs, west of the Kings River, is a tourist town and art colony, known for its Victorian architecture, with bathhouses, galleries and restaurants in a setting of steep hills and narrow streets, all maintained with strict building controls.
Berryville sits on a stretch of prairie east of the Kings River, surrounding by rolling hills and cattle and poultry farms. A Tysons poultry processing plant and a Walmart Supercenter are among the town’s largest employers.

In 1869, as northern Arkansas began to recover from the ravages of the Civil War, Boone County was created from the eastern portion of Carroll County, with Harrison as the county seat. Carrollton, a settlement 20 miles southeast of Berryville, was no longer at the center of Carroll County, and Berryville’s boosters succeeded in having the county seat established in Berryville in 1875.

In 1883, the Eureka Springs Railway was extended south from Missouri, and Eureka Springs quickly blossomed into a small city of hotels (quaint and magnificent) and bathhouses, fed by the waters of dozens of springs. The same year, the Arkansas General Assembly passed Act 74, creating two judicial districts for Carroll County.

Judge Crow’s bold attempt to merge the two districts probably left the Arkansas Supreme Court dumbfounded, but the opinion restoring the two districts simply cites some basic principles of American government to indicate the degree that Judge Crow’s opinion was off-base.

Judge Crow’s first contention was that the 1883 act of the legislature creating the two districts was unconstitutional because it attempted to create a new county, even though the language of the statute specified that the districts were to keep separate records as though they were in different counties, but that Carroll County should in all other respects “be one entire and undivided county.”

Judge Crow also determined that at 1997 legislative act, among other laws, repealed the 1883 act by implication. The Arkansas Supreme Court recited the rule that repeal by implication “is never allowed except where there is such an invincible repugnancy” that the old and new laws “cannot both stand together.” The 1997 law, and the others, may be messy and partially inconsistent, but they did not specifically repeal the 1883 act.

Almost as an afterthought, the Arkansas Supreme Court examined the Arkansas constitution, noting that the power to establish or dissolve judicial districts was a legislative power, not something that a judge could do.  Quashing Judge Crow’s attempt to merge the two judicial districts, the Supreme Court said that his order “shows a plain, manifest, clear and gross abuse of discretion.”

When you sue, you’d better ask for everything


Johnny Ray Chadd was the city administrator for Lake Ozark. City administrators in Missouri are always a vote or two away from getting fired, and Chadd was on the brink. On a vote to fire him in 2005, after he had served less than one year, the aldermen were deadlocked and the mayor cast the tie-breaking vote to let him go.

Chadd sued, claiming that the applicable Missouri statute and the city ordinance required the vote of a majority of the aldermen to remove him as a city officer. The mayor’s vote was irrelevant. In 2007, the appellate court ordered that Chadd be reinstated. He was rehired and immediately fired by the unanimous vote of the aldermen.

Chadd sued again, seeking back wages for the period between his first firing and the second, also alleging that he was wrongfully terminated. Apparently because Missouri law characterizes the employment relationship as at the will of the employer, Chadd alleged that his termination fell under the vague term “prima facie tort,” a legal theory that has never gotten any traction in Missouri courts.

The trial court threw out Chadd’s suit on Lake Ozark’s motion for summary judgment.

Chadd didn’t sue for back wages in the first suit, so he was barred from bringing up the issue now under the principle of res judicata. This principle means that courts will not consider claims that either were or could have been raised in a previous suit between the same parties. The trial court indicated that Chadd had been obligated make his claim for back wages in his first suit, where he was successful.

The prima facie tort claim also failed. Missouri’s at-will employment doctrine applies to situations where there is no employment contract for a specific term. A worker cannot win a suit for damages resulting from termination unless the termination violates some other statute, such as a statute protecting whistle-blowers or persons who are fired for filing workers’ compensation or racial discrimination claims, for example.  Calling a wrongful termination claim a prima facie tort doesn’t get around the at-will employment doctrine.

The Court of Appeals upheld the summary judgment in this opinion, Chadd v. Lake Ozark.

Check out these new Ozarks news channels


Two journalism professors in Springfield–Andrew Cline of Missouri State and Jonathan Groves of Drury–have guided their students (and others, in Groves’s case) to create online publications presenting local news and views. Both got off the ground and online this month.

Cline’s project is Ozarks News Journal, which describes itself as:

a laboratory for discovering how to make the best use of the World Wide Web and social media for producing journalism. Students in the JRN378 Multimedia Journalism class seek to understand more than just how to make the web and social media tools work for news gathering and publishing. They seek to understand how to use these tools to fulfill  the primary purpose of journalism: To give citizens the information they need to be free and self-governing.

Professor Groves has taken a different tack with SGF News, seeking content from members of the community. Groves hopes that SGF News will serve as a community forum on specific topics (currently 2010 elections), but with explicit guidelines, called Ground Rules:

  • No profanity.
  • Be civil. Don’t resort to personal attacks.
  • Support your arguments. Offer links to supporting material, and support your conclusions with facts.
  • Join the community. As citizens of the Ozarks, join the conversation and offer your thoughts so the best will bubble to the top.

It’s about time and about money: Missouri’s Sentencing Advisory Commission’s cost analysis


While I have staked out the territory of Ozarks law and economy for this blog, I’m humbled that the New York Times is doing a great job of researching and writing stories on my turf. The quality of the reporting is superb; those whose opinion of the Times is based on aversions to the biases of its op-ed writers (David Brooks, Gail Collins, Maureen Dowd, Paul Krugman, Tom Friedman and Nicholas Kristof) will find the news stories about Missouri to be evenhanded and well-sourced.

Ten days ago, the Times reported on Missouri’s public defenders refusing to take more cases, a situation that came to a head in Christian County, Missouri, across the street from my office in Ozark.

Today, the Times reported on the Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission’s provision of cost information to judges, so that judges can  Read the rest of this entry

Purchase option is assignable without consent, but there can still be a fight


The Hulls signed a real estate lease with a purchase option and put down a deposit of $56,000, which could be applied to the $198,500 purchase price, but would otherwise be non-refundable. The Hulls created a limited liability company (LLC) called Briar Road, and Briar Road attempted to exercise the purchase option. Stenger, the seller, refused, claiming that it had not approved the assignment of the purchase option by the Hulls to Briar Road.

What difference does the identity of the purchaser make? Read the rest of this entry

Is it necessary to affirm the right to hunt and fish in state constitutions?


“I liked it better when I was hunting birds there,” said the mediator, when he figured out the location of the garages at a Branson condominium. Seven attorneys gathered to attempt to resolve a dispute over rights to use four garages at the condominium.

As the Ozarks and much of rural America becomes suburbanized, many people want to protect their cherished traditions of hunting and fishing. In ten states, citizens have amended their constitutions to affirm the right to hunt and fish. Oklahoma has done so and the proposal is being considered in Arkansas and Tennessee.

As I hear people in the Ozarks express themselves about land and water and fish and game, I hear the same arguments that have been made to affirm the rights of native peoples to continue their hunting and fishing traditions, some of which have been protected from state regulation by federal law.

The Ozarks have been populated by people of mostly European ancestry for nearly 300 years. After many generations, it’s no wonder that members of old Ozarks familes feel like they need to assert themselves to hang on to their culture. And those whose families haven’t been around as long would naturally want to feel secure in their adopted traditions.

Whoops. Missouri Supreme Court releases man convicted in 1993 without jurisdiction.


The Missouri Supreme Court today ordered the release of Dwight Laughlin, who was convicted in 1993 of burglary and property damage crimes at the post office in Neosho, Missouri in State ex rel Laughlin v. Bowersox. You can read the briefs here.

At Laughlin’s trial in 1993, his attorney failed to Read the rest of this entry

“Years of combined experience” : how does it add up?


My wife and I have been married 36 years. I suppose you could say that we have 72 years of combined experience being married. Does that mean that I should be a marriage consultant?

Judging from the use of “years of combined experience” in advertisements, many people must think that combined experience adds up to expertise, even in the Show-Me State, where people are not sheeple but skeptics. Here are some samples: Read the rest of this entry